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ABSTRACT
This research explores the socio-legal activities of 
sentencing environmental offenders in Ontario. The research 
utilizes a political economy and post-structuralist framework. 
Prosecution data from the year 1989 was analyzed in order to 
supply an accounting of sanctions and offenders. This data set 
was complemented by the participation of ten sentencing officials 
in an in-depth questionnaire. The questionnaire data allowed for 
significant details to be extracted regarding sentence disparity 
within the current legal framework. The concept of the 
"implementation gap" as developed by Webb (1988) forms a vital 
component of the analysis. The wide-ranging issues surrounding 
the environment are having effects on many aspects of modern life 
as society struggles to rectify centuries of environmental 
abuses. This research takes note of the lack of scholarship on 
the environment, generally, and the sentencing of .environmental 
offenders, specifically, by the social sciences. This fact is 
illustrated by (Franklin, 1990). The central issues are 
illuminated in order to provide a window into the behavior as it 
currently takes place, in accordance with the given provisional 
penalties. The conclusion becomes clear; that the current focus 
of government and industry is counterproductive to environmental 
protection and that a co-operative strategy of all citizens, both 
corporate and public, is to achieve a new focus that can maintain 
human life into the next century.
iv
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I INTRODUCTION
Increasing technological advances over the past century have
resulted in two distinct developments; first, some of these
'advances7 have served to exploit, alienate, endanger, or
eliminate natural resources as well as living species from the
global homeland. Secondly, others have increased our awareness
and sensitivity to such realities. Both of these developments
are currently coming to fruition. Environmental exploitation is
a serious dilemma and environmental awareness, concern, or
conscience is growing in all sectors of the community;
Environmental law has undergone a substantial 
development, also in terms of an increasing awareness 
and concern on the part of politicians, special 
interest groups, and the public at large (Jeffery,
1984:43).
This awareness has reverberated. It is no longer just a popular
'nouveau' movement: it finds itself affecting political and
consumer life:
Environmental protection has been transformed from a 
fringe interest of a few "eco freaks1’ into a mainstream 
societal value (Webb, 1988:4).
This development of awareness can be seen manifested as political
agendas (green plan), corporate response (green products),
increased levels of financial support for legitimate
environmental groups, (Greenpeace, Pollution Probe), and as
successful activist campaigns (blue box, recycling).
There is a genuine and legitimate fear growing in people,
that unless changes are made, both aesthetic beauty, and human
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
health will diminish irreversibly. A quote from the federal
green plan states:
Health means not merely the absence of disease, but an 
optimal state of physical, emotional, social, spiritual and 
environmental well being (1990).
It is understandable that a concern and fear is developing. 
The ignorance of the past is surfacing at all levels as society 
realizes the finite, contained nature of our natural world. The 
practices of the emerging industrial complex of the past have 
left a noxious, painful legacy of degradation and death. A 
staggering statistic was reported by the Globe and Mail.
Victoria, British Columbia pumps ”20 million gallons per day" of 
untreated sewage into the Pacific Ocean (Mon. May 20 1991:sec.
A). United States officials were reported in the same piece as 
stating that Canada's environmental standards are in 1991 what 
the U.S.A.'s were in the 1950's.
Major Canadian industry plays a grand role in the pollution 
play. The Globe and Mail's report on business (June, 26,1991) 
contained an article entitled, "Cleanliness is next to 
profitability.” The article outlined the environmental 
performance of Algoma Steel. In 1988 Algoma dumped an average of 
3,806 kilograms a day of ammonia into the water from its Sault 
Ste. Marie mills. In the same year, mill effluent from Algoma 
contained ”a veritable gusher of oil and grease, averaging 2,475 
kilograms a day." It would appear logical to assume that the 
Ministry of the Environment is functioning to protect the fragile 
nature of the natural environment. However, the Ministry
2
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apparently feels pressure to protect business interests as well. 
The same article outlines the "safe" limits created by the 
Ministry fcr effluent by Algoma. Algoma's control order states 
that it must limit oil and grease discharges to a maximum of 
1,023 kilograms a day, suspended solids to 5,108 kilograms a day 
and phenols to 22.7 kilograms a day, 90 per cent of the time. 
Clearly, compromises are being struck between two competing 
interests— environmental, and business; the fallout from both 
interests being monumental.
People see environmental wrongdoing as originating either in 
private industry or state-administered facilities. It is 
therefore natural that the most often cited recourse measure is a 
legal change. Environmental groups have since been calling for 
increasingly harsher, more effective sanctions. One commonly 
suggested strategy is to place environmental offenses in the 
Criminal Code where more stringent penalties could be invoked.
The sentencing principle which drives public response is the 
attempt to deter future wrongdoing; however, deterrence implies 
that a given offender will stop the offending behaviour based on 
external constraints on his/her behaviour. It is argued that 
removal of these constraints (e.g., fear of fine or imprisonment) 
would inevitably result in the return of the undesirable 
behaviour. Therefore the mentality of the potential offender is 
never changed. Progress is not initiated; one only achieves 
forced compliance based on fear. It is on this point that one 
should enter the criminalization debate with care and
3
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thoughtfulness.
It can be noted that since environmental regulation in 
Ontario is governed by the provincial legislation of the 
Environmental Protection Act, (EPA), the Water Resources Act 
(WRA), and the Pesticides Act (PA), they are therefore not 
'crimes' per se. Accordingly, this work refers to environmental 
'wrongdoings' as a conscious generic label recognizing the 
semantical implications of the environmental criminalization 
debate. The absence of the word crime does not in any way 
reflect a position in reference to seriousness of a given 
offence:
Where responsibility for pollution is concerned, the 
average citizen would probably not hesitate to demand 
that polluting the environment should become a crime 
punishable under the criminal code. Those of us who 
live in a place like Windsor should be able to convince 
anyone of the need for penalties much more severe than 
we have at present to control a severe and worsening 
problem (Windsor Star, Jan:83).
The growing number of people involved in environmental 
groups and action committees would appear to reflect a desire 
from the general populace that laws need to be changed and made 
more severe. What is fuelling this concern? The social 
movements surrounding the environment are growing and are having 
an effect at various administrative levels that is fostering 
legitimate social change. The laws when changed or amended are 
applied at various levels; one level is the judicial.
In Ontario the three main Acts governing provincial 
environmental regulation are guidelines for action, demarcating 
ranges of sentences applicable for non-compliance. These cases
4
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are heard first by an independent judicial officer, a justice of 
the peace (JP). If a case is seen as too complex or legally 
pioneering, counsel or the sentencing official can have the case 
advanced to a higher court- However, the impact and role played 
by the JP (as a sentencing official) is coniciderable. This study 
will examine the sentencing behaviour of justices in 
environmental cases in Ontario by utilization of a case analysis. 
This analysis will be supplemented by a review of Ontario 
Environmental cases heard over the most recent recorded complete 
year of prosecutions (1989). The theoretical concept of the 
"implementation gap" (developed by Webb, 1988) between available 
legislation and actual use of that legislation, will play an 
integral part in directing the theoretical discussions 
surrounding the data.
Chapters 1 through 4 establish the theoretical and research 
backgrounds of the situation at hand, as well as the literature 
written on relevant topics. Chapter 5 gives a detailed outline 
of the contents of the three main provincial Acts in Ontario 
governing environmental pollution. This chapter clearly 
establishes the provisional penalties that are available when 
sentences are being imposed on convicted environmental 
wrongdoers. Establishing the penalties is the first element in 
the "implementation gap" concept. Chapter 6 grounds legally 
theoretical concepts in the intelligible realm of case 
descriptions. The legal cases in Canadian environmental law 
history that have set precedent are explored here. The defenses
5
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that are systematically employed within the environmental trial 
are illustrated from within the same case histories. Chapter 7 
is a focus on one environmental case, that being the Sault Ste 
Marie decision. The case has been influential enough to dictate 
an analysis of its implications both empirical and theoretical, 
chapter 8 sheds light on the popular debate regarding the use of 
the criminal law or regulatory law to control environmental 
wrongdoing. The implications of both forums surface to have 
important implications in how environmental-legal business is 
conducted, chapter 9 begins the analysis section by exploring 
the 1989 prosecution files from the Ontario Ministry of the 
Environment. The information is broken down generally into the 
corporate offender, the individual offender, and the sections of 
the relevant Acts contravened. Chapter 10 is a preface into the 
next section of analysis. This chapter describes the relevant 
variables that are contained within the hypothetical cases 
constructed for the questionnaire given to the justices 
overseeing environmental cases. Chapters 11, 12, and 13 break 
down the questionnaire responses by the justices, drawing 
conclusions within, based on the established theoretical 
concepts. Chapter 14 gives a brief overview of the issue of 
environmental wrongdoing using an element of post-structuralist 
theory as offered by Clause Offe. Chapter 15 gives a summary of 
finding and conclusions.
6
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II REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The increase in concern, and awareness of environmental 
issues, as demonstrated by numerous indicators (media reports, 
levels of activism, political agendas), has produced considerable 
popular literature. 'Green' books abound as instructional tools 
directing people to recycle, reuse and also as testaments for 
social change. Print and electronic media have increased 
environmental coverage exponentially in the last ten years. 
Environmental columns are commonplace as a daily or weekly 
feature of newspapers. The sociological world, however, has not 
responded as emphatically as the general populace. Studies of an 
environmental nature have been limited to a large degree in the 
natural sciences (biology, marine biology, engineering, 
chemistry). The social science disciplines have not responded to 
the new age societal awareness. The environmental literature in 
the social sciences is found mainly in the environmental law 
realm. However, the law literature cannot be seen as a 
reactionary development, as this field was in place previous to 
the dramatic increase in societal environmental consciousness.
This lack of participation may stem from the mistaken belief 
that 'environmentalism' is only a limited life span, a fad or 
'nouveau consciousness-' not a legitimate social movement. With 
the focus of all political agendas at least paying lip service to 
environmental concerns, this would indicate that the 
consciousness is widespread enough to carry considerable
7
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importance in voting behaviour. Academics may not have wanted to 
align themselves with a 'fleeting' social trend. The literature 
specifically on environmental wrongdoing is sparse at best in the 
sociological/criminological arena. Environmental 'crime' while 
being a legitimate legal issue has not been favoured with equal 
popularity in criminology. The results of this are a gap in 
terms of critical socio-criminological research. This being the 
case the literature cited in this work will be from a variety of 
foci, the final product of which will be an amalgamated 
literature representing the current interest in sentencing 
behaviour in environmental cases.
The literature on sentencing per se is quite extensive, 
however, it is centred mainly on criminal matters and does not 
clearly lend itself to application to provincial statutes (EPA, 
WRA, PA). The works can speak to the guidelines and criteria 
that surface in the courts and to the behaviour of the sentencing 
official (keeping in mind that all conclusions must be 
extrapolated to environmental issues).
Hogarth's 1971 study Sentencing as a Human Process was an 
extensive work which examined the sentencing behaviour of 
magistrates in Ontario. One of the principle findings of 
Hogarth's study underscored the extensive discretion given to 
sentencing officials, based on a high variation between minimum 
and maximum penalties. The sentencing official is guided by the 
given act or code toward this range, however, variation within 
the range is dictated by the individual's reading of the
8
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particular case. (Hogarth, 1971; Mandel, 1987; Palys, 1982; 
Lovegrove, 1984; Henham, 1986) In reference to the magistrates' 
use of penal philosophy, Hogarth found that as a group, 
magistrates tend to view reformation as the overwhelming 
principle guiding sentence, followed in descending order by 
general deterrence, individual deterrence, incapacitation and 
punishment. A marked inconsistency in the principles of 
sentencing among magistrates was revealed.
The sentencing behaviour of Hogarth's magistrates (for every 
offence considered) was significantly associated with their 
attitudes. The disparity discovered in the sentencing process 
does not necessarily indicate an ineffective use of sanctions.
The logical conclusion is that sentencing officials, when given 
discretionary power, will impose a sentence that best reflects a 
given hierarchy of sentencing principles subscribed to at the 
given time by that individual, and such a hierarchy would 
naturally be formed via the individual's attitudes. Disparate 
sentences do not necessarily reflect a continuum of 
laxity/severity, but merely indicate varying goals or desired 
outcomes by a given sentencing official.
It is not necessary to regulate or restrict the discretion 
of the sentencing official in environmental cases, but to 
centrally decide (via policy) what outcomes are desired through 
the use of the sanction. Discretion to a certain degree is an 
acceptable component of the system; however, this discretion 
should be contained within the logic of a set of clearly defined
9
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sentencing goals.
Subsequent to Hogarth's study, similar works have been 
undertaken that have, as a result of the disparity present, 
called for a restructuring of judicial discretion in regard to 
sentencing. The use of official guidelines and a sentencing 
matrix are some of the recommendations which arose from these 
studies.
Lovegrove's (1984) research analyzed one particular method 
of combatting disparity in Australian courts— the use of 
sentencing statistics made available to the judges determining 
cases. A 1980 Australian Law Reform Commission study indicated 
that 83 per cent of the judicial respondents favoured the 
provision of detailed sentencing statistics as a means of 
promoting uniformity (Lovegrove, 1984). Essentially this method 
relates prescriptive measures to the discretionary function of 
the law. An apparent danger in advocating forced guidelines is 
the inevitable desensitizing effect which may render law 
insensitive to societal and human values. The French penal code 
of 1791 which standardized sentences ultimately failed on this 
point. In time the sentencing court could become merely an input 
terminal where characteristics are sifted and an 'appropriate' 
sanction results, or be completely replaced by a computerized 
judiciary. This notion, however futuristic, begs question in the 
ethical and empirical socio-legal realm in reference to 
desirability. This system would quantify the sentencing process. 
The sentencing official could use the established criteria to
10
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place a given offence, offender, and characteristics surrounding 
them on a continuum or grid. At this point a sentence could be 
returned from within a predetermined range, thus reducing 
disparity. One cautionary observation to this principle: it
would appear that in removing judicial discretion it is merely 
transferred to policy makers who establish guidelines 
(independent of considerations of human contingencies).
The optimum sentences are therefore created based on 
averaging statistics of previous sentencing behaviour and in no 
way indicates the desired, or most effective sentence. The 
sanctioning process merely becomes the manipulated victim of a 
measure of central tendency. In making a guideline static, one 
creates the dilemma regarding the possibility of future change.
At some point in the future these guidelines may need to be 
amended to reflect societal changes. Legislative-legal change it 
is argued, is a difficult process at best.
The issue of disparity in sentencing has been a research 
concern among select academics following Hogarth. Palys and 
Divorski (1982) focused on sentencing disparity among provincial 
court judges in Canada. The study was a joint project of the 
Federal Solicitor General's office and Simon Fraser University. 
Palys and Divorski employed a simulated cases approach via 
questionnaires administered to 206 provincial court judges in 
Canada. The judges were given five case scenarios along with 
detailed offense and offender information (pre-sentence reports). 
They were asked to impose sentence as well as indicate the facts
11
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relevant to sentencing, assign these facts priority in terms of 
their importance, and indicate the legal objectives they were 
trying to maximize in imposing sentence. The research discovered 
that a wide range of sentences were imposed and that importance 
of facts varied, as did the legal objectives trying to be 
maximized. However, what was positive regarding these findings 
was the fact that "case facts, legal objectives and sentences 
tended to be packaged neatly as a cohesive and rational unit" 
(Palys and Divorski, 1982). Therefore this study revealed a high 
level of competence in sentencing formulation across judges; 
however, individual discretion was a prevalent, and natural force 
governing sentence disposition.
Proponents of lessening inter judge disparity in sentencing 
typically call for decreasing the judicial officers' 
discretionary powers within the given code or act (Palys, 1982; 
Lovegrove, 1984; Miethe and Moore, 1988). The use of guidelines 
has been introduced in some jurisdictions (Australia, Minnesota) 
to mixed reviews (Moore, 1986).
The sentencing officials naturally react to the imposition 
of such guidelines and this was the focus of study for Miethe and 
Moore (1988). Too often criminal justice reform movements 
neglect to gain information on the effectiveness of a given 
program from the people who are in contact with it every day. In 
the case of sentencing reform, these individuals are the 
sentencing officials (Miethe and Moore, 1988). Their study took 
the form of contacting judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys
12
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via a mailed survey and eliciting their experiences and attitudes 
concerning the implementation of determinant sentencing 
guidelines in Minnesota. In the Minnesota case guidelines were 
proposed as viable alternatives for constraining judicial 
discretion and enhancing the predictability, uniformity and 
socio-economic neutrality of sentencing decisions.
The guidelines were in place in 1980. The study was 
initiated after six years of functioning under the guideline 
system. The study showed that over 85 per cent of the officials 
believed the guidelines had reduced judicial discretion. They 
also believed that prosecutorial discretion had been reduced in 
the areas of 'passionate appeals' and 'grandstanding7 but had 
increased in terms of charging practices. The officials surveyed 
were found to be rather adamant about the guidelines giving 
prosecutors greater leverage to determine the actual sentence by 
the type and number of charges retained through conviction. The 
research also revealed general comments by the surveyed officials 
that supports previous comments (e.g., Hogarth).
Court officers believed the guidelines had "turned judges 
into technicians, created a bastion of non-thinking judges or 
developed a system in which judges could be replaced by clerks or 
computers" (Miethe and Moore, 1988). These findings would lend 
support to the theoretical literature regarding guideline 
implementation. It has been noted that guidelines merely shift 
the powers of discretion to the next lower echelon of social 
control agent (in this case from judge to prosecuting attorney).
13
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A trickle-down effect could also be postulated, in that, 
enforcement personnel, being aware of penalties under determinant 
guidelines, would use discretion in charging at the level of 
offence. In environmental wrongdoing offenses this could be 
disastrous. If sentences are dramatically increased (either 
fines or other carceral methods) and placed in a determinant 
matrix format, the regulatory enforcement officer (MOE) would be 
less likely to enforce a given statute given the consequences.
The commission of environmental wrongdoing is consistently linked 
to economic variables (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Yeager, 1987), 
either under the motive of profit maximization, or the lack of 
economic resources to implement abatement technology (under the 
current political-legal framework). Therefore, given the unique 
nature of potential offender characteristics, the urgency and 
potential consequences of given offences, one must consider the 
applicability of such formulas on Canadian environmental 
tribunal functioning.
In shifting the theoretical focus of the relevant literature 
to the critical, or political economic arena one finds, too 
often, a descriptive, utopian, non-realist radical view.
However, two works in the 1980's have bridged this tendency; 
Mandel's 1987 study directed at sentencing, and Yeager's 1987 
work from the United States, focusing clearly on environmental 
issues.
Mandel examined the structural connections of a given 
offender population and other institutional forms in society?
14
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specifically, the state and the economic sphere (labour force, 
employment). There are connections between the various spheres 
of social life, each 'functioning' in a skewed symbiotic 
manner:
It is the function of the state and law to maintain the 
structure of productive relations by providing norms and 
institutions which allow these relations to flourish 
(Mandel, 1987:163).
This statement serves to tie together two important 
variables in the arena of environmental wrongdoing; (i) the state 
and law, (ii) productive relations. The interdependency of the 
various state systems and the productivity of the working class, 
as outlined within the political economic literature, affects 
environmental cases more so than traditional crime. In a case 
where the offender is also a mass employer, extra legal 
influences inevitably enter the judicial process, most noticeably 
at the policy formation level. Mandel's research indicates a 
strong position that the criminal law is not "majestically 
equal," as Anatole France had believed. The criminal law and its 
structure "is applied in anything but an equal manner. The 
phenomena occurs at all levels of the system, including the 
judicial sentencing stage" (Mandel, 1987:164). The dysfunctional 
nature of criminal law provisions is advanced again and gives 
credence to proceeding cautiously in entering environmental 
regulation into the Criminal Code.
Mandel focuses on traditional sentencing goals and analyzes 
them from a political economy perspective. He notes that 
punishment varies, based not only on offence types but offender
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types. The above observation can be reduced to the notion of an 
offender's 'character' being measured by such documents as 
previous records and pre-sentence reports. "...Essential to this 
is the offender's relation to the productive apparatus, that is, 
his or her employment status, employment history, and occupation" 
(Mandel, 1987:164). This brings up interesting theories on the 
prosecution of an environmental offender within a criminal 
trial. Sanctions may be potentially more extensive or damaging, 
however one would have little confidence to believe they would be 
invoked, given that most environmental offenders presently being 
prosecuted could (and do) project an image of impeccable 
character and intention.
Yeager's 1987 work on the structural bias present in 
regulatory law enforcement by the environmental protection agency 
in the U.S. merged two lines of enquiry: (i) the corporate crime 
literature (Clinard and Yeager, 1980 et al.) and (ii) the 
political economic tradition (Clement, 1969; Coleman, 1985). 
Yeager sampled 214 manufacturing plants, discharging wastes into 
the water system in New Jersey. He tested this population based 
on the following variables: firm economic strength, utilization 
of agency appellate procedures, violations of the Clean Water 
Act, and sanctions imposed for violations. Yeager found that 
firms with greater economic strength could make successful use of 
appeal procedures and therefore insulate themselves from 
subsequent violations pending appeals. In using the appeal 
route, an obvious increase in success of overturning decisions
16
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was found. High legal costs were the main barrier for smaller 
companies. Yeager found that the EPA could, if they chose to, 
advance the hearing to the criminal court system. However this 
was not done very often. The criminal hearings that proceeded 
were almost exclusively against smaller companies. Yeager 
believes the EPA was only willing to challenge smaller companies 
in this arena because of their legal vulnerability, (i.e., They 
could not access sophisticated legal counsel and resources.) 
Forcing compliance to high technical standards (abatement 
equipment) was found disproportionately burdening to the small 
firms. Large corporations enjoy economies of scale in the sense 
that they can amortize compliance costs over larger volumes of 
production, and potentially avoid or delay implementation.
The largest and most specific work on sentencing and the
environment was undertaken as a study paper by the Law Reform
Commission of Canada in 1985. It outlines many of the current
issues in the flow and ebb of environmental policy. The report
examines, once again, the general principles regarding fining and
sentencing, as well as providing recommendations for sentencing
reform. Tne latter half of the paper was critiqued by John
Wilson (1986) who asserted that the Commission authors, Swaigen
and Bunt, neglected to pursue certain sentencing issues engaged
in the environmental dilemma:
In my view, the Report places too much 
emphasis on the adjustment of fines as a 
sanction, but neither this recommendation, 
nor that dealing with incarceration, is 
adequately dealt with on a theoretical level 
(Wilson, 1986:332).
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One of the conclusions arrived at in the Commission's paper
referred to the criminalization issue:
We doubt that the determinants lie in the words civil 
and criminal, but if they do, then the characterization 
of environmental offenses as civil supports our 
recommendations (Swaigen and Bunt, 1988:44).
The Law Reform Commission of Canada produced two other
focused environmental works via the protection of life series.
Shrecker's (1984) work entitled Political Economy of
Environmental Hazards, examined state connections to the creation
and implementation of environmental regulatory legislation.
The report, Pollution Control in Canada: The Regulatory
Approach in the 1980's (Webb, 1988) examined the use of the
regulatory scheme of controlling environmental wrongdoing. The
concept of the "implementation gap" was developed in this work.
The "gap" is quite simply, the difference between what is
written in legislation as available, and what is actually used or
enforced by the given officials:
What legislation suggests government is doing, and what 
government is actually doing have often been two 
different things (Webb 1988:27).
The "gap" plays a role in the behaviour of all players on the
environmental game field. Therefore this concept will surface on
numerous occasions throughout this thesis. An exploration of the
legislation coupled with an examination of the actual and
controlled use of that mechanism will allow for a clear
measurement of the "gap" as it exists in current environmental
regulatory functioning.
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Ill THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Global industrialization has created an increasing economic 
base for nation states in terms of the gross national product. 
This economic base is built through capital investment of both 
foreign and domestic corporations. Increasing state power via 
revenues, creates a strengthened capitalist class. Modern 
society is governed at all levels by commodity relations 
(economic and social). The everyday social world of the 
'average' citizen is not immune to the dynamics of the
relationship between the state and capital. At this point in the
20th century it appears that a reorganization is constantly 
taking place in the political economic arena, both at various 
national levels and international levels. This in turn has 
produced new avenues for legitimate social welfare concerns to be
articulated at the state level that previously may have been
discounted as counter-productive to capital accumulation. The 
situation also offers new vehicles for initiating social change. 
For the state, these impending changes offer challenges to its 
legitimized power.
The development of advancing capitalist formations has posed 
new challenges for the state's regulatory capacity. Recent 
changes in the political environment can be used to look directly 
at the state's role in intervening in issues involving 
environmental illegality.
In using a political economy approach to the analysis of
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corporate/industrial environmental crime, one must address the 
issue of the relationship between capital and the state. To what 
extent are the two compatible or contradictory? To what extent 
does their relationship exist outside the discretion of nonstate 
sources of public information? These questions are fundamental 
in addressing issues surrounding law and policy formation, and 
implementation, as well as state-initiated mandates for 
enforcement agencies. Understanding the outcomes of such 
initiatives are central to enhancing our knowledge of 
environmental illegality.
Traditional political economy (Miliband, 1969) underscores 
the importance of properly defining 'the state'. The state is 
not a tangible entity; it is not a fixture of the political 
environment of the day. " The state is not a thing, that it does 
not as such exist" (Miliband, 1969:49). The state can, however, 
become manifest in its peripheral institutions. If the state 
does not exist, its institutions are the minions of its will. 
Miliband continues that one aspect of the state is the 
government, the two are not synonymous terms. The government is 
a tangible entity that can be defined as such by society in 
general. The state is more of a mind set or an entrenched power 
source that surrounds the bureaucratic functioning of the 
institutions, as well as the given political party in power 
(government). "If it is believed that the government is in fact 
the state, it may also be believed that the assumption of 
governmental power is equivalent to the acquisition of state
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power" (Miliband, 1969:49). There is a valid connection between 
the state and government. The government of the day acts in such 
a way as to represent the 'state'. However, sometimes the 
motivations internalized by government do not produce beneficial 
outcomes for either the state or the general populace. Therefore 
as government acts, via its institutions by changing legislation, 
taxation, implementation of services, and military action, it is 
supposedly representing the collective state.
The second player in the political economic relationship of 
the state regarding legal issues is that of capital. Capital can 
be seen in a simplistic way as the owners of the means of 
production. However, with increased modernization this 
definition is incomplete theoretically. In reference to 
capital's involvement with the state, capital must be viewed as a 
group of successful capital accumulators who collectively possess 
control over a majority of commodity forms. In order to be 
collectively powerful, capital must also possess an element of 
group cohesion. Advancing capitalism and the market system is a 
historical progression, therefore the most powerful cohesive 
force among capital interest is experience, as well as the 
emergence of various associations that represent capital 
interests to the state (business associations, Canadian 
Manufacturers, Fraser Institute) (Ornstein, 1985). It has been 
suggested that capital's collective power does not end here, that 
there exists an inner group of Canadian capitalists. Power is 
concentrated in the hands of a minority of corporate directors
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that establishes the 'inner group'. These select few have 
influence on university boards, charitable and voluntary 
organizations; also these members are in frequent contact and 
have influence with government (Useem, 1978). In theorizing 
about the pervasive nature of capital within all realms of social 
and political life, it becomes evident that with capital 
accumulation comes power and that capital's power must inevitably 
translate to the preserving of its interests via the political 
institutions.
The state via government has a delicate balancing act to 
perform in modern market societies. The development of the 
capitalist economy has been paralleled by the development of the 
welfare state in order to 'band aid' the alienating and damaging 
aspects of commodity based relationships. The administration of 
welfare state services, while to a degree helps the state 
legitimize itself through popularity with the voting populace, 
also acts in a way that is negative to the operation of the 
government and capital. The government must exist within a 
simple democracy; that being true, it is at the mercy of the 
voting public. Thus the government can be viewed as a product to 
be successfully marketed to society. The marketing strategy 
inevitably consists of welfare state improvement claims. There 
is always a disparity between the government's claims and its 
ability to enact the proposed service:
This leads to a noticeable loss of confidence between 
party organizers on the one hand, and their voters and 
members on the other, which results from the fact that 
the parties must almost necessarily frustrate the
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expectations they generate in obtaining a governing 
majority (Offe, 1979:68).
The government in addressing social welfare considerations, 
creates a desire for more from the populace (labour generally). 
The contradictory element is that welfare state considerations 
can contravene the working of capital accumulation and 
subsequently the self-regulating mechanisms of commodity market 
forces. The balance therefore is between public opinion, 
necessary for election in the 'democratic' process via 
administration of welfare state services, and maintaining the 
interests and successful functioning of capital, in order to 
generate revenue to implement such services. The condition has 
been called cyclical ungovernability (Offe, 1979).
A proper analysis of legislative and institutional 
functioning in regards to environmental regulation and 
enforcement dictates that a theory on the relationship between 
the state (institutions) and the potential violators 
(corporate/industrial business) is introduced. There are two 
main views on the functioning of the state in respect to the rest 
of society and subsequently in the workings of law and order 
(e.g., environmental regulation). Authors such as Miliband 
(1969) and Mills (1967) have stressed the instrumentalist 
perspective. A ruling class of elites in society emerges and 
dictates the use of resources and the functioning of the state 
apparatus for the rest of society. The few who emerged to take 
power were those who had gained political and economic dominance 
and thus had power over the state. The state can therefore be
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viewed as an 'instrument' for the ruling class to achieve its 
ends (Chambliss, 1982). Studies were conducted based on the 
instrumentalist view that would seem to verify this perspective. 
The findings indicated the following: Individuals who sit on the
boards of major firms all attended the same schools, vacation at 
the same resorts, marry into each other's families, and appoint 
one another to positions of power (Domhoff, as cited in 
Chambliss, 1982). Money determines the outcomes of all elections 
from municipal to the federal. The immense amount of money 
required to run a political campaign sets up a condition so that 
large contributors receive a built in bias in decision making 
(Chambliss, 1982). This view contends that if capital dictates 
the functioning of the state, then within capital there must 
exist a common set of interests. This is not always the case.
The instrumentalist view would also have difficulty explaining 
instances where governmental decisions have been overwhelmingly 
opposed by capital.
The second paradigm surfaced in the late 1960's and early 
1970's . This view believes that there is a structural objective 
relation between the state and capital, that the state will 
operate in the long term interests of capital within the inherent 
contradictions it faces via the class struggles (Chambliss,
1979). Clause Offe is an example of a contemporary writer 
subscribing to a structural view of the interaction of state and 
capital. The state does not respond to pressures from individual 
groups within capital? it represents the consensual interests of
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a society that happens to be dominated by capital interests.
This view can accommodate the sporadic implementing of policy 
that momentarily contradicts capital interests. The state must 
protect the process of capital accumulation for three reasons. 
First, for its survival the state depends (via taxation) on the 
production of surplus capital. Secondly, political stability 
depends on economic stability. Thirdly, the survival of the 
state and the interests of the capitalist class coincide, in that 
both depend on maintaining the viability of the economy and 
political stability (Chambliss, 1982:308). This description 
alludes to the balancing act that Offe (1979) suggests the state 
must perform between welfare state concessions and capital 
interests.
If welfare state interests and capital interests are 
essentially in opposition, and if environmental regulation is 
also in opposition to capital accumulation, one could contend 
that environmental regulatory policies can be viewed as a welfare 
consideration (social and/or ecological). The drive for profit 
has been cited as the most prominent reason for 
corporate/industrial illegal behaviour (Clinard and Yeager,
1980). The protection of the environment, (that becomes the 
exploited property of industry amidst the profit drive) does not 
create a positive sum balance in the quest for efficient and 
productive manufacturing. Therefore the state finds itself in a 
position where it must intervene to some degree in the workings 
of capital in order to preserve the welfare considerations of the
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environment.
The connection between the environment and welfare is
underscored when one considers the extensive chain of events that
are created when there is environmental disruption or 'eco-cide'.
"When we speak of environmental disruption we mean in effect the
disruption of [man's] natural and social environment" (Kapp,
1971). As a result there are far-reaching effects resultant from
environmental degradation, to the social worlds of individuals,
as well as the economic fitness of the market. This
interconnectedness of forces is of interest. Offe suggests that
the welfare state, to a degree, is beneficial to capital in
order to ensure a happy, healthy worker. Environmental
illegalities can be viewed as a product of the functioning
market, and they in turn have a detrimental effect on the social
and natural world of the individual. Pollution is a dysfunction
of the market economy. Its effects compound exponentially over
time. It is noteworthy that Kapp, writing two decades ago,
addressed this issue;
Environmental disruption cannot be explained adequately as 
a case of market failure, unless the term is understood in 
the sense of the failure of the market system and of 
conventional economics to come to terms with inter­
dependencies and complex causal chains which have long 
ceased to occupy a peripheral place in modern industrial 
societies and are bound to assume increasing significance as 
residual industrial waste products and debris are permitted 
to be discarded freely into the environment (Kapp, 1971:97).
The connection between the social and the economic or market 
implications of environmental exploitation delineate clearly a 
role for polity to play in this equation (and therefore political
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economic theory). The state in modern capitalist formations 
becomes a regulatory body attempting to keep the capital needs of 
industry in a precarious balance with the welfare needs of 
society as a whole (Offe, 1979).
The problem the state faces is that this dilemma is uncommon 
to it. Environmental concern is both an economic issue and a 
welfare state issue. Environmental degradation, in conjunction 
with expanding technologies for exploiting resources (both 
natural, and manufactured), has reached the point where the 
environmental base may not be able to sustain capital development 
for any extended period under current practices.
The development of modern political formations has created 
interesting developments. Traditionally, there have been clearly 
discernable factions along the political continuum, each of which 
would have different diagnoses and prognoses for the state's 
functioning. Today, some authors suggest that there is a clear 
merging of diagnosis from left to right. The two extremes both 
voice their discontent over the functioning of the welfare state 
apparatus (Offe, 1979; Tourraine, 1988). The welfare state 
emerged out of developing market relations and the 
commodification of society. The state began to intervene in 
these relations in order to stabilize fault lines in the 
functioning of the market? however this mediation by the state 
became a snowballing characteristic. The more social programs 
the state introduced, the more people required and desired.
First, the state was forced into fiscal problems resulting from
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increased drain on revenue from the welfare state mechanism. 
Second, capital complained that the state was making the market 
dysfunctional. The modern state mechanism has therefore entered 
a self-perpetuating phase of 'ungovernability' (Offe, 1979). In 
terms of prognosis, the left would call for increased regulation 
and decreased privatization of services. However, the right 
contends that unhampered commodity exchange and an increased free 
market will return the social/economic system to homeostasis.
It is quite evident that in the current political 
environment offe's ungovernability thesis is presenting itself as 
a reality. It has been proposed that there is a focus by both 
the right and left on welfare state mechanisms as problematic.
The environment has previously been established as a legitimate 
welfare concern, both politically and socially (by definition). 
Therefore it would be plausible that social movements with 
decreased emphasis on political ideology and more on social 
concerns (environmental movement, sexual rights, women's 
movement), would gain legitimation and prominence as vehicles for 
socio-political change in the 1990's (Offe, 1979; Tourraine,
1988).
There has been a consistent increase in the environmental 
consciousness over the last decade, with particular intensity 
over the last two years. It has been suggested that this 
'nouveau' consciousness is a middle class or bourgeois enterprise 
and consequently of no significant impetus as a socially 
mobilizing or unifying force. One could contend, however, that
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certain events illustrate the contrary. First, the New 
Democratic party (NDP) in Canada has seen significant increases 
in the popular vote over time. Second, consider the election of 
the NDP provincially in Ontario. The NDP has been traditionally 
a labour-oriented party and the environment has been a major item 
on their platform for some time. However, in the past provincial 
election the environment was held in a primary light on many 
fronts, as witnessed from debates, news coverage, and policy 
statements. One could argue that the environmental conscience is 
emanating both vertically and horizontally in society.
Recently in outlining the mandate for their term the 
Ontario NDP set the stage for environmental legislation that 
undoubtedly will have widening effects in the political economic 
fronts. First, a stay was alluded to on all new nuclear 
generating operations. A policy such as this is beginning to 
place increased importance on environmental and social welfare 
vis a' vis a proactive stance, as opposed to blind investment for 
short term gains. Secondly, the Government of Ontario has 
proposed an Environmental Bill of Rights. This document would 
allow class action to be initiated by individuals against 
corporations or other individuals. Essentially, it may give a 
right to a clean social and natural environment (subject to 
judicial/legal challenge and ruling). Undoubtedly this will 
create a massive amount of case law and allow for the judicial 
transformation of existing legal guidelines. It would appear 
that via this route, the Government of Ontario is choosing to use
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the legal structure as an institution of the state to 
democratically transform the notion of environmental quality, 
albeit more expensively and slowly than governmentally-legislated 
change.
These events in the political forum that lend credence to 
the power of the environmental lobby, both formally and as a 
pervasive, expanding conscience in society as a whole, tend to 
show the importance of social movements in eliciting socio­
political change. The political structure has evolved in late 
market economies so that ideologies and practice are self 
crippling leading to ungovernability. Political transformation 
through military or quasi military revolt, has been essentially 
discounted. The resultant power is apparently being allotted to 
legitimate social concerns by a modern society eager for 
affirmation of anything constant. In terms of social change 
there appears to be segmented threads of the population clinging 
to traditional institutions (church, traditional family unit, 
marriage), while at the same time these very institutions are 
losing legitimacy. They are losing it by being increasingly shut 
off from the state. This dissolution of the traditional social 
framework, in turn, affects the state and the economic forecast. 
These conditions being so, the legitimate power of the social 
movement as a socio-political force is increased at the current 
point of political economic development.
A third segment of the research focus must be 
articulated within a theoretical framework: the issue of the
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sanction or sentence imposed by the judicial body to the given
wrongdoer. Sentencing theory can best be formulated as a set of
goals or criteria that govern its imposition.
A sentencing rationale according to legal doctrine provides
an answer to the following question. What is the justification
for imposing legal sanctions? (Canadian Sentencing Commission,
1986:12) There have previously been two ways of addressing the
issue of justification of sanctions. First, retributivism and
just desserts. This perspective requires that retribution be
exacted from those who are guilty of blameworthy behaviour.
Retributivism is directed towards the past behaviour of the
offender and stresses the necessity of public condemnation of
this behaviour. Second, one can address the issue of
justification in terms of their future beneficial consequences or
their social utility. The social utility of sanctions was
consequently measured in reference to crime prevention or
control. This could be done potentially by deterring potential
and past offenders by incapacitating and rehabilitating them.
The three utilitarian goals were therefore deterrence,
incapacitation and rehabilitation (Canadian Sentencing
Commission, 1986). A third approach has gained favour in recent
years— attempts to achieve redress for the victims of crime:
Redress is understood in a very wide sense and ranges 
from procedural requirements such as the introduction 
of victim impact statements in the sentencing process - 
to the development of compensatory sanctions and 
reconciliation programs, which are victim-oriented.
This third approach is supplemental not a replacement 
of the aforementioned (Canadian Sentencing Commission, 
1986:128).
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The third aspect of sentencing justification holds a 
precarious position to some elements of environmental concern.
The call by some groups for increased criminalization surrounding 
environmental regulation (e.g., place provincial environmental 
jurisdiction in the Criminal Code), has elicited a rebuttal 
concerning the rigidity of the criminal law and its longstanding 
traditions and evolutionary process to deal with societal and 
human issues. Various traditional fringe groups that have 
recently moved into the realm of legitimate socio-political 
movements stress the fact that often the most devastated victims 
of environmental wrongdoing cannot and should not be measured in 
terms of economics or human loss. These victims are, in fact, 
the inhabitants of various ecosystems, both flora and fauna. If 
one assesses this claim within the traditional framework and 
guidelines of the Criminal Code or even the legal tradition, the 
results can seem expansionist or ill-founded. However, one would 
find it difficult to contend that such victims did not exist and 
that some form of redress, separate from the economically derived 
model of traditional sanctions should be incorporated into an 
evolving tribunal on environmental affairs. These facts have led 
groups to call for caution on blindly thrusting environmental 
concern into the arena of criminal litigation.
The theory underlying the application of criminal or 
legislative sanction is synonymous with sentencing's often-cited 
philosophical aims: retribution, deterrence, denunciation, 
incapacitation and rehabilitation. Each of these aims will be
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assessed in terms of its content and implications to the
environmental sanction.
These aims of sentencing are an abstract creation of legal,
social, and ethical scholars. Their value is steadfast in that
forum; however, the transition from a philosophy to its
application by the sentencing body can meet with opposing, or at
minimum, confusing variables. The behavioral components existing
in the real life world of the sentencing judge play a role in the
application of sentencing principles to any given case at hand
(Canadian Sentencing Commission, 1985). This discretionary or
semi-autonomous power is not necessarily contradictory to the
ideals of equal and equitable justice, however, the dynamics and
extent of its existence in the changing realm of environmental
law should be discerned.
A problem at the centre of sentencing guidelines is that
most court officials feel that all aims carry importance:
Attempting to apply combinations of the aims, however, can
produce contradictory results. Accordingly, sentences are often
justified by reference to certain official aims but could
actually be applied based on internalized sentencing goals that
could vary somewhat from the official criteria. Sentencing
undoubtedly becomes "a human process" (Hogarth, 1972):
Where the sentencer does, in fact, attempt to combine 
elements of individualized and tariff sentencing, he 
runs the risk that his attempts to accommodate both 
aims will lead to the achievement of neither (Nadin- 
Davis, 1982:5).
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(i) Retribution, or making the punishment fit the crime: Pure 
retribution, can be seen as vengeance towards the offender. The 
likelihood that vengeance would be a guiding factor in sentencing 
is unlikely in the realm of environmental wrongdoing given the 
fact that corporate industrial bodies are often the bodies 
committing the most devastating damage. Thus, one sees the re­
entry of the leading player in the environmental sentencing 
drama— the economic considerations, the dollar value.
Retribution carries with it the consideration that the punishment 
must not exceed the harm committed. This Kantian view has been 
re-expressed by Judge O' Hearn, a Nova Scotia county court judge. 
MThe measure of punishment must be the harm that the offender has 
actually committed. No matter how large a penalty one thinks 
would actually be required to deter any specific individual, the 
court is not justified in going beyond the maximum penalty 
prescribed for the harm done" (as in Nadin-Davis, 1982:31). 
Therefore it seems appropriate, given the above comment that some 
groups see fines in environmental cases as mere licencing fees 
for large corporations. The sentencing judge, being bound by the 
above principle, could never exact an element of deterrence by 
the imposition of a fine to a large corporation. This shows the 
ineffectiveness of traditional sentencing principles on 
environmental issues.
(ii) Deterrence: The concept of deterrence has within it two
distinct goals: first, discouraging others from committing
similar offenses; secondly, discouraging the given offender as an
34
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
individual case. These two concepts being referred to as general
and specific forms of deterrence, respectively.
It would appear logical that the main aim of sentencing in
environmental cases would be general deterrence, based on the
widespread nature of industrial operation (the most frequent
offenders), as well as individual misconceptions regarding
use/misuse of natural environments. Specific deterrence would
seem easier to achieve, however, the process would be inevitably
slow and costly based on a dramatic increase in regulatory
enforcement that would be necessary. The main flaw in specific
deterrence is its reactive stance to the given problem. General
deterrence or regulatory compliance is the logical goal, however
one is presented with the dilemma of sentencing options vs. the
resultant effect of these options. The disparity shows again the
ineffectual nature of applying traditional criminal type criteria
within the realm of environmental wrongdoing (Wilson, 1986; Law
Reform Commission of Canada, 1986):
In general the deterring effect of the penalty is more 
indirect and subtle. It sets up an atmosphere by which 
society exhibits its disapproval of the conduct and 
thus works on the criminal by his tendency to pay 
deference to the opinion of his fellows in the 
community in which he lives (O'Hearn co. crt. judge,
1970 in Nadin-Davis, 1982).
This strategy is popular when dealing with various forms of 
white collar crime (Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Yeager, 1987) and is 
therefore applicable to environmental wrongdoing. This strategy 
is a legitimate goal and outcome of the function of the justice 
system: The question surfaces, however, regarding its
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appropriateness in environmental regulatory policy. Social 
changes, both legislatively and regarding societal opinion are 
slow processes. Sources indicate that at current rates of 
environmental exploitation irreversible damage is being done. It 
could be said that a time component exists in reference to 
effectual changes. It would be illogical, therefore to pursue 
solely means of combatting this exploitation that are effective 
only over long periods of time.
(iii) Denunciation is a sentencing aim that allows the sentence 
to indicate society's abhorrence to the offence. This aim is 
again traditionally criminal-based and has the effect of 
retaining focus on the specific nature of the crime or the 
individual who committed the offence, similar to the effect of 
general deterrence. The dramatic changes in the socio-political 
status of environmental groups and the pervasive nature of an 
environmental conscience could indicate that denunciation may 
find its way into sentencing equations. The determining factor 
would be the degree to which a sentencing judge had internalized 
various elements of environmental consciousness, based on the 
human nature of sentencing (Hogarth, 1970).
(iv) Rehabilitation: When this measure is considered, the 
sentencing official is using an individualized sentence. The 
individual who has committed the offence is the focus. The 
sentencing official must have logically concluded from the 
evidence that there existed a malady inherent in the behaviour of 
the individual, and not a product of structural intervention. A
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sentence would then be administered that was in the interest of 
reforming the individual's behaviour as to avert subsequent 
wrongdoing.
In situations of environmental wrongdoing the focus on 
rehabilitation as a primary sentencing criteria is unlikely. The 
focus of sentencing officials is most often pointed to deterrence 
(Wilson, 1986). The circumstances surrounding environmental 
cases are often involving corporations or some other less 
tangible entities (Swaigen & Bunt, 1985; Wilson, 1986; Yeager, 
1987). Therefore it becomes a problem of logistics to discern 
who should actually be the focus of rehabilitative measures.
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IV METHODOLOGY
The methodological sequence of events of the study begins 
with an extensive review of the relevant literature, both 
criminological and legal. Given the limited nature of the 
literature pertaining directly to Ontario, the review will 
include works from numerous geographical and legal jurisdictions.
The focus of the study is one of sentencing and prosecutorial 
behaviour surrounding environmental regulation. Consequently, a 
qualitative emphasis on data collection is appropriate because of 
the interplay between the individual's perceptions, and the 
eventual professional outcome. Northey and Teppermen explain the 
use of qualitative methodology as "...Grounded, discovery- 
oriented, exploratory, expansionist, descriptive, and inductive" 
(1986:57). This clearly describes the methodological goals of 
this study. The study is unique, in that it amalgamates prior 
methodologies used to study sentencing, with established 
criminological legal theoretical concepts in order to produce a 
specific work on environmental sentencing. Franklin refers to 
the absence of focused works on environmental sentencing in her 
1990 paper, concluding after an extensive review, that "studies 
of sentencing in environmental cases are unfortunately rare."
The fact that environmental regulation/criminalization is 
currently in a transitional phase, both socially and politically 
offers credence to the use of this method.
The researcher has used a questionnaire format to gather the
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appropriate data. Questionnaires were selected in order to 
increase the sample size of the study. The number of JP's and 
judges overseeing environmental cases on a regular basis in 
Ontario is sufficiently small enough for this to play a 
significant role in the final figures. Originally the researcher 
had believed that the focused interview would be the best format 
to extract the necessary data, however, time, travel, and 
economic constraints dictated the change.
When assessing the imposing of sentences by judges, one can 
differentiate between two major approaches. The first is termed 
the 'archival' or 'actual cases' approach. The second is the 
'simulated cases' approach (Palys and Divorski, 1982). It is the 
second of these approaches that this study will follow. Internal 
validity is maximized with this context, since one is giving 
identical information to each sentencing official. External 
validity, however, may be diminished with this approach, given 
the fact that the cases are hypothetical. The cases were 
developed so as to be legitimately plausible, therefore 
minimizing this concern.
Participants were selected purposively from a list of JP's 
and Judges who have been involved in environmental cases on a 
consistent basis. The list was compiled for the researcher in 
consultation with the Ministry of the Environment of Ontario, 
Prosecution Division. The individuals were contacted initially 
by phone call, and given a brief outline of the study. 
Confidentiality and anonymity were assured. The resultant sample
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was then mailed the questionnaire. Included were the measures of 
sentencing behaviour. Scenarios of actual environmental cases 
were adapted from the Canadian Environmental Law Reports, with 
changes made only to standardize scenarios and reliably test for 
what the judiciary felt were the key determining factors of a 
case. This questionnaire also included a section that allowed 
comment on various aspects of environmental justice delivery 
practices and concerns. The body of data acquired from the 
questionnaire forms a major part of the analysis. However, a 
second data set allows for statistical inference to be drawn 
concerning prosecution practices in Ontario for 1989.
The researcher acquired from the Ministry of the Environment 
of Ontario (Legal Division) a printout listing all prosecutions 
for the 1989 judicial period, in the province. This data 
contains the convicted individual or company's name, relevant 
legislation for the conviction, and form and/or amount of 
sentence. This data allowed the researcher to analyze who was 
being prosecuted, and the ranges of sentences that were 
implemented. The second data set complements the questionnaire 
data received.
The mailed portion of the study was sent to approximately 28 
judicial districts (counties) in Ontario. Two copies of the 
questionnaire were given to one contact person in each location, 
with the instructions to pass one copy to a colleague if 
possible. The districts selected were done so with the goal of 
achieving a representative geographical distribution across the
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province. This allowed for representation of rural agricultural, 
rural mixed, suburban, urban industrial, and dominant aquatic 
regions.
The prospective respondents were originally contacted by a 
letter accompanied by the questionnaire. No responses were 
received within the first three week period. A follow-up letter 
was sent out at this point, one response was received. Telephone 
contact was then initiated with the other respondents. In order 
to achieve the final ten responses, as many as four calls were 
required. Two respondents discarded the questionnaire and were 
mailed second copies, at which point their participation was 
secured.
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V THE PROVINCIAL ACTS AND THE PROVISIONAL PENALTIES
It should be noted, that for the purposes of this study, the 
use of the word environmental in the title of the work is not all 
encompassing. The author contends that "the environment" can, 
and does include all natural species, and habitats thereof, 
regardless of the connection or degree of intervention therein by 
human society. Hence, optimum, environmental legislation can 
cover animal life, plant life (forestry) as well as human 
intervention within these spheres (pollution, degradation, 
development). However, this study will focus on one aspect of 
the environment— 'pollution' legislation (EPA, OWRA, PA) in 
Ontario. These three Acts govern mainly discharge or pollution 
activities. Justification for the omission of other pertinent 
Acts is achieved by maintaining a clear focus on this highly 
controversial area of environmental legislation. The interplay 
between the state and business is underscored via pollution 
regulatory behavior.
The three Acts that will be covered are the primary Acts 
governing judicial focus on environmental issues on a daily basis 
in Ontario (see Ministry of Environment data 1989). The 
Environmental Assessment Act maintains a high profile, both in 
the media and in hearings, based on its purpose of land use 
planning. However, the three Acts covered herein generate the 
most exposure and influence in the sentencing of environmental
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wrongdoers in Ontario.
The Environmental Protection Act
The EPA is the principle governing document for 
environmental protection in Ontario. The Act states as its 
purpose: "to provide for the protection and conservation of the
natural environment" (R.S.O. 1980, c.141, s.2). The statement is 
a legally unobtrusive, socially ambitious aim that undoubtedly 
can achieve little but deflate the observer's enthusiasm as it 
proceeds. The Minister (MOE) oversees the operation of the Act, 
and enforcement of its provisions. Through the Minister, the 
Ministry personnel enact the provisions held within the document. 
These duties are as follows:
a) to investigate problems of pollution, waste management, 
waste disposal, litter management, and litter disposal
b) conduct research related to contaminants, pollution, 
waste management, waste disposal, litter, litter disposal
c) conduct studies of the quality of the natural 
environment, meteorological studies and monitoring 
programs
d) conduct studies of environmental planning, designed to 
lead to a wise use of the natural environment by man
e) convene conferences and conduct seminars and educational 
and training programs relating to contaminants, 
pollution, waste, and litter
f) gather, publish, and disseminate information relating to 
contaminants, pollution, waste or litter
g) make grants and loans for:
1. research or training of persons relating to 
contaminants, pollution, waste or litter and,
2. the development of waste management facilities
in such amounts and upon such terms and conditions as the 
regulations may prescribe.
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h) establish and operate demonstration and experimental 
waste management systems
i) appoint committees to perform such advisory functions as 
the Minister considers advisable
j) with the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, 
enter into an agreement with any government or person 
relating to the protection or conservation of the 
natural environment
It becomes evident that the mandate of the Ministry of the
Environment under the relevant Acts is more extensive than
policing the regulatory policies. The Ministry has a heightened
concern for interaction and liaising with various interest
groups. This position is understandable given the regulatory
nature of the Acts. Co-operation with industry in achieving
environmental protection is more desirable than an adversarial
stance. However cooperation often gives rise to negotiation, at
which point the balance of power in the cooperative relationships
shifts towards industry (Webb, 1988:7).
Given the regulatory philosophy maintained by past and
present provincial administrations, a need for self-reporting of
discharges or ''accidents" by industry or individuals is essential
to the integrity of the process. Section 14(1) of the EPA
initially makes the statement on such requirements:
Every person who discharges a contaminant or causes or 
permits the discharge of a contaminant into the natural 
environment out of the normal course of events that 
causes or is likely to cause an adverse effect shall 
forthwith notify the Ministry (R.S.O. 1980, c.141 S .14).
Penalties
The sentencing of environmental wrongdoing is inevitably
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constrained by the provisional penalties established within the
relevant Acts. The three Acts discussed are essentially parallel
in outlining legal frameworks for action, however, minor
differences exist only in the amounts of fines available.
Differences will be noted when appropriate.
There are no sentencing guidelines or formulas issued to
sentencing officials, in reference to environmental cases.
Judicial discretion is a prominent feature of the functioning
environmental legal process. Discretion is high, and is bound
only by the provisions of the Acts. Individual offence
characteristics can be interpreted as mitigating or pertinent
based on the perceptions of each individual sentencing official
(Hogarth, 1972; Henham, 1976; Lovegrove, 1984; Palys and
Divorski, 1984). Thus, the following provisions directly
influence and dictate the magnitude and form of sanctions for
environmental wrongdoing.
The general offence category is outlined initially in Sec.
146(1) of the EPA. "Every person who contravenes this Act or the
regulations is guilty of an offence." The Act continues to
include non-compliance with an order issued by the Ministry as
being an offense. The issue of the control order is central to
the functioning of the Ministry as a regulatory body. Once again
the notion of a "process of negotiation" (Webb, 1988; Sabatier,
1975) is underscored by the use of such an order. Sec. 16 of the
EPA states that:
Where any person causes or permits the discharge of a 
contaminant into the natural environment, so that land,
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water, property, animal life, plant life, or human 
health or safety is injured, damaged, or endangered, or 
is likely to be injured, damaged or endangered, the 
director may order the person to:
a) repair the injury or damage
b) prevent the injury or damage
c) where the discharger has damaged or endangered 
or is likely to damage or endanger existing 
water supplies; provide alternate water 
supplies.
(R.S.O. 1980,c.141,s.16).
As a result, once a discharge takes place and is reported 
(usually by the discharger), a process of negotiation takes place 
where a control order is issued to the discharger to rectify the 
situation and return the activity to within Ministry established 
guidelines for discharge levels. Sec. 116(2) allows for 
submissions to the Ministry to be made by the offender regarding 
the control order, prior to the order being issued. This 
provision legitimates the negotiation process within the 
legislation:
The person to whom the Director intends to issue the 
control order may make submissions to the Director at 
any time before the control order is issued (R.S.O.
1980, c.141, s.116(2)).
Given the limited human resources of the Ministry for 
'policing pollution' the responsibility for reporting spills and 
environmental wrongs is placed often conveniently in the hands of 
the polluter. This situation does not have to be inherently 
counter productive to environmental protection. However, 
considering the level of adversarial relations between Ministry 
and industry is, at this time, still relatively high, the 
possibility that unbiased reporting will occur in a majority of 
cases is unlikely:
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...the so called regulatory model, which typically 
consists of a general offence prohibiting harmful 
emissions outright, unless those emissions are 
authorized pursuant to the terras and conditions of 
"agreements" (for example certificates, or control 
orders) (Webb, 1988:6).
Consequently a great deal of environmental protection 
activity is undertaken in secret away from the scrutiny of public 
involvement, or at least public knowledge. The potential for 
corruption and/or ineffective environmental protection is 
obviously high.
The Acts are well drafted legal representations of an 
idealistic goal. However, the goal of creating legal statutes is 
to be able to represent all possible scenarios by using inclusive 
language. If one evaluates the potential of the Acts by focusing 
on the provisions therein, one could be inclined to feel positive 
about that potential. An example is the statement in the 
aforementioned Sec. 16: "...so that land, water, property ,
animal life, plant life, or human health or safety...". Legally 
it is necessary when drafting a piece of legislation to be 
inclusive in delineating prohibitive behaviour. In practice, the 
implementation of the legislation at the enforcement and control 
level is a highly discretionary and selective process. It would 
be utopian to believe that a violater of plant or animal life 
would report such activity, or that enforcement personnel would 
place animal or plant protection (for the animal or plant's sake 
alone) as important. If the harm done or absence of such natural 
life has adverse effects, whether aesthetic or economic impacting 
on humans then it may become important. Native residents of
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Wholpole Island in southern Ontario, have been frequent victims 
of toxic water spills but their marginal status has resulted in 
little effort to prevent such errors or create effective 
punishments.
The separation of humanity from nature carries implications
for survival, both biological and economical. Natural resource
exploitation without concern for preservation is self defeating:
The modern concepts of 'progress' and unlimited growth 
are formulations of the attitude toward nature which 
requires that man view himself apart from and superior 
to his physical environment (Vaughn, 1974:10) (in 
protecting the environment, Dwivedi, O.P.).
A further illustration of the interactive nature of
Ministry/offender relations can be seen in Sec. 146(2):
a person to whom an order or program approval of the 
Minister or the director is directed who complies fully 
with the order or approval shall not be prosecuted for 
or convicted of an offence in respect of the matter or 
matters dealt with in the order or approval that occurs 
during the period within which the order or program is 
applicable (R.S.O., 1980, c.141, s.146(2)).
The Ministry, by virtue of this clause, absolves the
offender from further prosecution during a given period set out
by the Ministry. Given the fact that a set of guidelines has
been issued to the offender, the order will contain certain
instructions. The offender, complying with these instructions is
not liable for subsequent spills in the specified time period.
The Ministry shoulders the technical responsibility for creating
the recipe for remedial action. This chain of events potentially
allows industry to become complacent in regards to environmental
pollution abatement research. The state, via the Ministry,
48
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
maintains ownership of the technological research problem (and 
costs) dictated by 146(2) of the EPA. Industry is free to 
maintain operations that result in polluting behaviour, only to 
"negotiate" a control order if a 'major7 mishap occurs. The 
state is neglecting a powerful research force, that of industry 
to take on part-ownership of the research problem. The 
conditions also create a text, wherein polluting behaviour is 
viewed as an 'inevitable7 outcome of production operations that 
will be conveniently dealt with by the Ministry.
The penalties for contravening the general conditions of the 
Act, or for failing to comply with an order, or certificate of 
approval, or licence, or for a director or officer of a 
corporation that engages in an activity that may result in a 
discharge of a contaminant, and who does not take 'reasonable 
care7 to prevent the discharge, are as follows:
Individual
For each day or part of a day that the offence occurs 
Not more than $10,000 on first conviction
Not more than $25,000 for each subsequent conviction
Corporation
For each day or part of a day that the offence occurs 
Not more than $50,000 on first conviction
Not more than $100,000 for each subsequent conviction
Sec. 146(b) outlines conditions for subsequent offenses. An 
offence is subsequent if previous convictions have been issued on 
the EPA, 0WRA, or PA.
The penalty structure changes when "actual pollution" (EPA,
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page 244:margin notation) is involved. Any corporation that 
contravenes Sec 13(1) (which prohibits discharging a contaminant 
into the natural environment), or non-compliance with a stop 
order (Sec.119(1)), can receive the following:
For each day or part of a day that the offence occurs
Minimum $2,000 --- maximum $200,000 on first conviction
Minimum $4,000 --- maximum $400,000 each subsequent
conviction
It is notable that the minimum fines for subsequent 
convictions are increased by only $2,000 for a corporation. 
Considering the fact that the fines are amounts for each day, one 
may believe that the maximum fines are indeed quite sufficient. 
However, the maximum fine structure is a value in place for the 
"worst offence" (R̂ . v. Panarctic Oils Ltd. . [1983] N.W.T.R.
14 3) and the upper limits are very rarely approached (see 
analysis section).
If an individual is convicted of contravening Sec. 13(1) or 
119 (1) they are liable in addition to, or in substitution for 
the aforementioned fines for individuals, to imprisonment for a 
term of not more than one year (R.S.O. 1980, c.141, s . 1 4 6 ( 2 ) ) .
The above provision does not apply unless the court is 
satisfied that the person was notified, before entering his or 
her plea, that a penalty would be sought under Sec. 146(2) 
(imprisonment).
It is an interesting point of legal functioning that the 
provisional penalty of imprisonment is not provided for directly, 
as an option for the sentencing official. The process of being
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informed of the prosecution's desire to seek such a penalty,
prior to the defendant's plea, would allow for legitimate plea
negotiations between counsel, to remove such a request. This
provision removes the ability to use the imprisonment sentence
from the sentencing official and places that discretion in the
hands of counsel. Therefore the provision becomes little more
than decorative wrapping on the magnitude of the provisional
penalties, or at best, the tool of select ambitious prosecutors.
Sections 146(c)(d) offer 'creative' sentencing options.
146(c) states:
The court that convicts a person of an offence under 
this Act, in addition to any other penalty imposed by 
the court, may increase a fine imposed upon the person 
by an amount equal to the amount of monetary benefit 
acquired by, or that accrued to the person as a result 
of the commission of the offense, not withstanding any 
maximum fine elsewhere provided (R.S.O. 1980, c.141, 
s.146(c)).
This section again allows for a positive view of sentencing 
potential when analyzed theoretically. However, in legal 
practicality, the ability of the court to effectively ascertain 
the monetary benefit gained through the offending behaviour is 
minimal. The goal of the section is honourable. The wording, as 
it stands, renders the clause, ineffective. The difficulty for 
the courts in establishing a figure based on profit gains through 
offending behaviour is underscored in Saxe (1989).
Sec. 146(d)(1) is described in margin notation as an order 
to protect and restore the natural environment, either on the 
initiative of the court, or upon application by counsel for the 
prosecutor.
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Sec. 146(d)(2) extends the court further into the
theoretical guess world of sentencing options:
An order under subsection (1) may contain such other 
conditions relating to the circumstances of the offence 
and of the person that contributed to the commission of 
the offence as the court considers appropriate to 
prevent similar unlawful conduct or to contribute to 
rehabilitation (R.S.O. 1980,c.l41 s.l46d(2)).
The phrase "...to prevent similar unlawful conduct11 is
clearly referring to deterrence (both specific, and general).
This has been shown to be a primary goal of regulatory
legislation via sentencing (Swaigen and Bunt, 1985; Yeager,
1987). However, the effectiveness of this mandate has yet to be
substantially illustrated by the literature (Hagan, 1982) or in
practice by the Ministry (see MOE data, 1989).
The statement "...to contribute to rehabilitation" is yet
another flowery inclusive catch phrase that gives the state a
shield against general accusations that sentencing is too
focused, and not creative enough to deal with the range of
offenses. In practice the sentencing officials avoid such dark
recesses of the legislation. A possible explanation for this
avoidance is due to the legal ambiguity of such phrases. A
sentencing official invoking such a section in sentence could be
forced to have his/her judgement extensively dissected during an
appeal hearing. Justification for entering a philosophical area
would undoubtedly require a well articulated philosophical
(reinforced by legal fact), argument. The sentencing official is
therefore more comfortable with using the traditional fine
sanction.
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Note: The provisional penalties within the Water Resources Act 
(OWRA) are drafted in the same form as the EPA. The creative 
sentencing options remain as does the imprisonment clause. The 
fine structure differs as follows.
General Offence Category
Person
For each day or part of a day that the offence occurs 
Maximum $10,000 on first conviction
Maximum $25,000 for each subsequent conviction
Corporation
For each day or part of a day that the offence occurs 
Maximum $50,000 on first conviction
Maximum $100,000 for each subsequent conviction
Actual Pollution (e.g., sec.16(1) or 19(2)b)
Corporation
For each day or part of a day that the offence occurs
Minimum $2,000 ---  maximum $100,000 on first conviction
Minimum $4,000 ---  maximum $200,000 subsequent conviction
(R.S.O. 1980,c.361s.67(1),68(1)(2).)
Note: The penalties outlined within the Pesticides Act are the
same as listed above.
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VI LEGAL CASES SETTING PRECEDENT IN CANADA: 
DEFENSES AND SENTENCING FACTORS
The defence of due diligence is available to the accused and 
they can avoid liability in environmental cases by "proving they 
took all reasonable care." This defence in environmental cases 
surfaced in the landmark (R̂ . v. Sault Ste. Marie) case (1978).
In a strict liability offense (see proceeding section) the 
defence of due diligence becomes available to the accused. The 
accused must show that they .took 'reasonable care' to prevent the 
offense. The onus of proof, on a balance of probabilities, lies 
with the accused.
Dickson, J. in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, at p. 373 C.C.C. 
writes:
In this doctrine it is not up to the prosecution to prove 
negligence. Instead, it is open to the defendant to prove 
that all due care has been taken. This burden falls upon 
the defendant as he is the only one who will generally have 
the means of proof. While the prosecution must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
prohibited act the defendant must only establish on the 
balance of probabilities that he has a defence of reasonable 
care.
In the 1989 case of R. v. Wholesale Travel the due diligence 
defence was challenged in reference to the burden of proof. The 
Wholesale Travel group were jointly charged with five counts of 
false or misleading advertising, contrary to section 36(1)(a) of 
the Competition Act. In the original trial the judge dismissed 
the charges citing certain sections of the Act as 
unconstitutional in that they do not allow for a proper defence. 
On appeal, the appeal judge held that the given section of that
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Act did not violate the Charter and remitted the case for trial. 
The Wholesale Travel Group appealed to the court on a question of 
law. The Group believed that the Act forced the defendant to 
admit actus reus in order to avail himself of the only defense 
prescribed (due diligence). Since the burden of proof is placed 
on the accused to show absence of negligence this could result in 
the conviction and imprisonment of the accused even when the 
trier of fact has a 'reasonable doubt' as to the fault of the 
accused.
Zuber, J. A., in speaking for the court ruled that the case 
should be remitted for trial, however, certain sections did 
violate the Charter. Forcing the accused to establish a defence 
on the balance of probabilities was found not to offend the 
Charter; forcing them to disprove an element of the offence does. 
(R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc. (1989))
In an environmental case where the only criteria for 
establishing due diligence is producing an authentic, tangible 
certificate or licence, the above dilemma does not surface. If 
diligence is a nebulous concept that is difficult to prove to the 
court, the absence of an adequate defense may exist and thus 
become unconstitutional. This shows that Dickson J.'s third type 
of offence (strict liability) can become blurred under certain 
conditions.
In a precedent case involving due diligence the court 
established that the care taken must reflect diligence of a 
reasonable professional (R. v. Placer Developments Ltd. (1983)).
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The above discussion serves to underscore the intricacies of 
the law, be it regulatory or criminal. The potential to obscure 
the primary goal while ensuring procedural fairness lends 
credence to a different focus in environmental protection.
Officially Induced Error
The case of R. v. Dow Chemical Canada Inc. (1987)
The defendant disposed of tar waste by deep well injection and
was charged with three counts of operating a waste management
system without a certificate of approval issued by a director in
violation of s.27(a) of the E.P.A..
The commission of the act was not contested.. The issue was
the validity, or existence of the certificate of approval. The
defendant produced a letter on the letterhead of the Department
of Energy Resources Management, dated May 31, 1967. This was the
purported certificate of approval. The corporate accused did, in
fact, operate and rely on the approval for a period of 17 years,
with the full knowledge of the Ministry officials. Given that
the approval was valid, if flaws exist in the approval that cause
environmental degradation, it is the 'error7 of the Ministry and
is up to them to rectify the situation.
The defence of officially induced error is described in
detail in (R. v. Cancoil Thermal Corp.t:
The defence of 'officially induced error7 is available 
as a defence to an alleged violation of a regulatory 
statute where an accused has reasonably relied upon the 
erroneous legal opinion or advice of an official who is 
responsible for the administration or enforcement of 
the particular law; In order for the accused to
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successfully raise the defence, he must show that he 
relied on the erroneous legal opinion of the official 
and that his reliance was reasonable. The 
reasonableness will depend upon several factors 
including the efforts he made to ascertain the proper 
law, the complexity or obscurity of the law, the 
position of the official who gave the advice, and the 
clarity, definitiveness and reasonableness of the 
advice given.
In the Dow Chemical case, the issue is not so much the error 
in the approval itself, but the lack of interest, or negligence 
shown on part of the Ministry in updating the order. To allow 
waste disposal, such as tar injected into the ground based on the 
approval of an official in 1967, 17 years later is not action 
that will maintain the quality of the natural environment.
Once again, one witnesses procedural hopscotch as impeding 
environmental protection. Defences must be available in judicial 
hearings. However, proper action by the Ministry would divert 
some of the dilemmas prior to the court stage.
A non-legal interpretation can be inserted at this stage. 
Although it is 'fair' legally to allow defences such as 
officially induced error, in the everyday world of 
business/Ministry interaction a clearer set of conditions 
prevail. It would be 'reasonable' to assume that a company such 
as Dow would have reason to believe that injecting tar waste into 
a salt cavern below ground may have detrimental effects on the 
surrounding environment. The legal structure in place, ensures 
that the corporate entity knows that it is operating under an 
outdated or seriously deficient approval of the Ministry which is 
also the body that initiates any legal action. It may also be
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that alternate methods of disposal may exist, albeit at an
increased expense or inconvenience. The point being, that a
reasonable person or corporation knows that such practices are
not conducive to environmental protection, but business
decisions, framed by the regulatory legal provisions, allow it to
continue. The alternative is a change in the
industrial/Ministerial relationship.
The close reading of the defence as outlined in R. v.
Cancoil Thermal Corp. and R. v. Sault Ste Marie provides the
operative word as 'reasonable'. This legally ambiguous term is
illuminated somewhat by Barton (1980):
To seme extent, at least, the requirement that the 
actor have been reasonable is merged with the 
requirement that he have proceeded from a position of 
mistake rather than ignorance.
He then alludes to the practicality of the defence:
...the court is more likely to excuse a person who made 
an attempt to conform to the law or to ascertain his 
position, than one who has proceeded in sheer 
ignorance.
The case of R. v. Texaco Can. Inc. (1986, 1 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 
100.) brings to light a number of issues. The case has 
relevance to the levels of liability. The Texaco Canada station 
in Beachburg, Ontario was the subject of an investigation and 
subsequent prosecution, specifically under sec. 13(1) of the EPA. 
The soil in a drainage ditch adjacent to the property had become 
contaminated with gasoline. Based on the investigation, the 
gasoline holding tanks were excavated. The initial complaint was 
initiated by a neighbour in April. A further complaint was filed
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in the fall of that same year; excavation was initiated in 
November. A two inch crack was discovered in the bottom of one 
tank, which was believed to have caused the leak. The word,
'leak' becomes the operative word. The trial judge dismissed the 
charges because the 'leak' did not constitute a 'discharge' as 
required by sec. 13 of the EPA.
Section 13 does not make reference to a leak. The words 
used in this section denote the necessity of an outside force, or 
energy. The words deposit, add, emit, and discharge require the 
intervention of energy, it cannot take place by itself. The 
section has since been amended, however it is an illustration of 
the barriers that the semantics of procedural precedent create 
for achieving the primary goal of environmental protection.
Section 13(1) has been shown to be an offence of strict 
liability and as such an element of actus reus must be 
established by the Crown. The act was not present, based on the 
absence of the external force mentioned previously. However, if 
so proven, MiJlette, DCJ stated that Texaco's position was 
virtually unassailable as to due diligence. He was referring (in 
his opinion) to the extent to which Texaco went in order to co­
operate and address the situation as it developed.
Other defences that are common in environmental trials have 
been articulated in previous cases as well. "An act of God" is 
used to remove liability. Defendants have used the following 
scenarios: air pollution as a cause of high winds and unusually
heavy rainfall causing contaminants to enter water sources.
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Granted the act itself is out of the control of the defendant (at 
the critical moment); nonetheless adequate precautions should be 
taken to prevent discharge in the event of such occurrences. For 
example, overflow contingencies should be required in the event 
of heavy rainfalls. Every year the news media reports pollution 
levels rise due to high rainfalls, causing drainage to be 
diverted through storm/sewer systems and into waterways. These 
events close beaches every summer in the lower Great Lakes basin. 
The consistency of the events over the years would dictate that 
changes to the drainage system be implemented to avoid such 
contamination from entering storm runoff systems. Such avenues 
are not pursued. Is the cost not yet justifiable?
The 'mistake of fact' defence has also been used in 
environmental trials. This defence is similar to officially 
induced error. The defendant appeals for removal of liability 
when they have "an honest but mistaken belief in the existence of 
circumstances which, if true, would make the act for which the 
accused is charged an innocent act" (R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 
(1978), 40 C.C.C. 2d. 350).
It is notable that all the above defences are not claiming 
that the act was not committed, but providing justification for 
their commission, by attempting to provide legal arguments 
suggesting that they are not responsible in law for the act.
Environmental cases at the trial stage, seldom contest the 
occurrence of the environmental wrongdoing. Judicial time and 
resources are spent searching for justifications. Given the lack
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of tangible benefits for society or the environment, that arise 
from the judicial process surrounding environmental wrongdoing, 
it would appear that the current practice is inefficient.
The sentencing of environmental offenders is a process which 
has developed through legal precedent shaped by legislation. A 
variety of factors become either pertinent or mitigating in 
establishing sentence for the offender. Some of these factors 
were discussed previously as to their theoretical implications 
and goals. The discussion may now turn to the legal practicality 
and origin of the given sentencing factors. Chapter 12 will then 
deal with the third stage of these factors, that being the 
sentencing officials' perceptions of their applications. 
Sentencing Factors In Legal Precedent
a) The extent of harm created as a result of environmental
wrongdoing is a prominent sentencing factor. At first glance,
consideration of such an effect would appear to be tantamount to
a fair system. However, to institute criteria for ascertaining
degrees of harm is extremely difficult (or should be). In order
to ascertain harm, a hierarchy of interests must be established.
This hierarchy has been assembled with only one element, the
interests of human society:
Self-interest and the homocentric want-oriented 
perspective of instrumental rationality would give way 
to a theory of the natural order and our place in it 
(Emond 1984).
The sentencing factor of extent of harm, as well as the 
dilemma of Ministerial responsibility via certificates of 
approval or control orders is illustrated in the case of R. v.
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Cyanamid Canada Inc.
Cyanamid of Canada Inc. was charged with one count of
depositing a deleterious substance, namely, ammonia effluent from
its Welland chemical plant into water frequented by fish, namely,
the Welland River.
Cyanamid produces chemical fertilizers. On the bank of the
river Cyanamid extends a "36 inch diameter sewer pip'3" from its
operation, from which "from time to time" a liquid effluent flows
into the Welland River. The waters of the Welland River flow
under the Welland Canal by means of a specially constructed
siphon. The river waters are sucked down and under the canal,
and come up on the other side to continue their easterly flow.
Water pressure changes involved in the siphon process, create the
situation where no fish can survive going through the siphon.
This causes all fish west of the Welland Canal to be isolated
from fish east of the canal. Where the Welland River meets the
Niagara river the waters are directed through a series of canals
constructed by Ontario Hydro and are carried to Hydro generating
plants, pass through turbines and are discharged into the Niagara
below the falls. Fish in the canal system are doomed. The
principal species of fish in the east section of the Welland
river (Cyanamid area) are catfish. The trial judge writes:
"They are a scavenger fish and are not prized by sports-
fishermen." The trial judge again references the species in
listing mitigating circumstances:
[The area]... is a poor quality fishing area in any 
event and not a good sport fishing area because the
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waters there are principally inhabited by catfish 
(Wallace PCJ).
The references are qualified by their importance to sports
fishing people, and therefore society's value. The fish have no
standing as living creatures. To extend the logic of Wallace, if
a species of trout or walleye inhabited the area this would have
dictated a more severe penalty. Maintaining a focus on human
value of the environment obscures the primary goal. No mention
is made in judgement of future damage surfacing, of silt or soil
damage, only to the potential of the fish to provide human
satisfaction (either in an economic or recreational pursuit).
Once again, the occurrence is not contested. Justifications
for the occurrence are pursued at the expense of the natural
environment and of cooperative progress.
The effluent was tested by an independent, Brock University
researcher against the control of the river water above the
discharge pipe. Fish were placed in the two liquids. The fish
in the aquariums containing the effluent died in 51 seconds, the
other fish lived for many hours.
The discharging of this effluent was known to the MOE. The
Ministry had studied the production process of Cyanamid and
produced an engineering emission report for both air and water.
The report culminated in the issuing of a control order in
February, 1978. The compliance schedule was to be completed by
1984 (six years). The order was also prioritized:
They gave higher priority to air pollution control 
rather than to water pollution control, presumably on 
the basis that air pollution affecting thousands of
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citizens was cf higher priority than water pollution 
affecting a handful of catfish (Wallace, in R. v.
Cvanamid).
The effluent that had been discharged for an indefinite period 
prior to 1978 would continue for at least six more years. The 
same liquid that killed fish in 51 seconds emitted through a 
three foot diameter pipe. The water table, the river soils, the 
downstream receiving waters and their inhabitants, all become the 
victims of a list of priorities.
Since Cyanamid was acting under the supervision and approval 
of the MOE, they maintain no liability for wrongdoing based on 
the contents of the control order during the specified period. 
However, the trial judge did find them guilty of the charges 
under the Fisheries Act; they were fined $1.00.
One cannot expect a corporate entity to act in any other 
fashion than calculated rational behaviour. In the above 
situation Cyanamid, the corporation, cannot be faulted for the 
action (post facto). They complied and co-operated with the 
Ministry as required by the "full extent of the law." The point
of interest and concern is the action of the Ministry. A six
year implementation period may be necessary in order to minimize 
economic burdens to the company. Is it adequate for 
environmental protection? This case illustrates clearly a number 
of dilemmas present in environmental legislation and sentencing. 
First, the Ministry/industry relationship; the negotiation 
process can only favour industry in terms of compliance
schedules. Second, the judicial thought processes in
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establishing levels of importance, in reference to 'extent of 
harm7, are clearly subjective. Third, the legislative 
difficulties embodied in the nature of control orders and 
approvals: are they effective instruments of environmental
protection, or merely convenient tools for easing political 
economic impacts on industry and the government?
The co-operative stance of Cyanamid as indicated at trial 
should be applauded and encouraged, however, Ministerial 
reluctance to rule with more of an iron fist does not lend to 
creating supportive legislation. It only furthers the gap 
between action and legislation. The situation illustrates the 
fact that the offenders are not the exclusive enemies of 
environmental protection, Ministerial inaction also exacerbates 
the dilemma.
b) Intent: The factor of intent is not a necessary component to
be proven by the prosecution in most environmental cases, based 
on Sault Ste. Marie. If intent can be shown as a factor it can 
play an important role in both defence strategy, and sentencing.
In the case of R̂ . v. Lehnen (1985) the issue of intent 
surfaces as a sentencing factor. The accused was charged with 
contravening the OWRA 23(3). An order was issued by the MOE but 
not complied with. The accused owned a trailer park and was 
installing sewer pipes therein. The OWRA via the MOE dictates 
that water lines and sewage lines be separated by at least eight 
horizontal feet. The accused was placing both pipes in the same
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trench. The MOE did consult the accused as to the regulations
through the order, however the order was clearly disobeyed. The
trial judge and prosecution viewed this as a mental act of intent
to contravene the OWRA. The accused had also been previously
convicted under the same section of the Act. These factors were
clearly a factor in sentencing. The trial judge stated:
I appreciate that the corporate respondent may have 
been in some financial difficulty at some time during 
the 1982 and 1983 year. This however does not excuse 
the deliberate flouting of the law which occurred here 
(Carter DCJ in L  v. Lehrien).
In a 1987 case involving-Gulf Canada Inc. the company was 
refused a permit to dump waste at sea (North West Territories). 
They proceeded to dump waste in contravention of regulations.
The actions of Gulf Canada were clearly viewed as intentional and 
this was stated as a factor in sentencing (R. v. Gulf Canada Inc. 
(1987).
c) Previous convictions are an important sentencing factor in all 
criminal and regulatory offenses. The case of L  v. B.E.S.T. 
Plating Shoppe Ltd. is an environmental illustration. The 
accused operated a plating operation in Metropolitan Toronto. On 
May 28, 1985 a prohibition order was issued against the accused 
by a justice of the peace, to terminate discharges of metals into 
the sewage system in excess of limits. Prior to the order 
B.E.S.T. Plating had been fined and convicted on 49 occasions for 
violating the sewer use bylaws. Only after that many convictions 
was a stop order issued. The length of time that unregulated
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discharging was allowed illuminates a possible mindset in regard
to the Ministry. The Ministry/Industry relationship may have
been deep-rooted enough to allow the enforcement division to
overlook the occurrences and allow the behaviour to continue,
with only the licencing fees of the sanction as a fine.
Subsequent to the order, four further offences were committed.
Fines accrued prior to the order amounted to $67,750 of which
only $15,000 had been paid. The discharges into the sewage
system were analyzed to contain cyanide, copper, zinc and nickel.
The cyanide was 20 times in excess of permissible limits.
It was clearly established at trial that the accused
corporation was indeed the source of the discharges, and that the
director was aware of the stop order. (Knowledge of the order is
all that is necessary to maintain liability for its contents.)
[(e.g., see R̂ . v. Jetco Manufacturingf. 1
The defence counsel stated, in speaking to sentence:
It was almost impossible for anybody to comply with 
this particular by-law while operating a plating 
business.
This attitude is one of extreme danger to the goal of 
environmental protection amidst the political economic concerns 
of the day. If, in fact, one cannot operate a plating business 
without damaging the environment (as Mr. Bucker for the defence 
is indicating), then new technologies for production and/or 
treatment of by-products should be legislated to be developed. 
The operation of blatantly environmentally harmful industry 
should not continue on the rationalization that "it's the only
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way it can be run." A time has to arise where one goal takes 
priority, at least for an interim period. Industry appears to be 
using illogical arguments in thinking that unabated pollution via 
production, can continue to allow for capital accumulation over 
the long term.
In R. v. United Keno Hill Mines Ltd. the trial judge stated:
that previous convictions show that the accused was 
more interested in profits than compliance, therefore 
higher fines were justified.
In passing sentence the judge (in R. v. B.E.S.T.) stated,
"I view his continuing flagrant disregard of violations as a
serious matter." Therefore previous convictions and actions
(inactions) are a stated factor in the case law.
d) The 'Worst Case' scenario has been adopted on a number of
judicial areas to be a hypothetical construct justifying the
harshest sanctions. In regulatory offences this usually is
referring to the maximum fine levels. Environmentally, the case
of Ri v. Panarctic Oils (1983) verifies this position:
Ignoring obligations, knowledge of harm being done, no 
attempt to cleanup put case into "worst case" category; 
maximum fines reserved for these offenders.
Swaigen and Bunt, describe factors that move a situation towards
the worst case, surreptitiousness, deliberateness, recklessness,
attitude, and disregard for instructions of environmental
authorities (1985:24).
e) The size and wealth of the corporation inevitably surfaces as
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a mitigating factor in sentence. The factor is addressed in 
varying ways by sentencing officials. Carter, DCJ as stated 
previously in R-_ v . Lehnen found financial hardship of a 
corporation to not be an excuse for "deliberate flouting of the 
law." However, in R. v. United Keno Hill Mines the size and 
wealth of the corporation was a mitigating factor. A precarious 
situation arises in sentencing behaviour when the accused is a 
municipal corporation. Environmental wrongdoing by 
municipalities is a source of degradation that is often obscured 
by high profile cases involving corporations. The fact that 
municipalities are collective representations of individuals in a 
community for administrative purposes, and not a profit- 
orientated entity, poses problems when imposing sentence. The 
problems of discerning corporate responsibility is the same as 
that for a profit-driven industrial corporation; however, this 
dilemma cannot be escaped by imposing a fine (as is the case in 
most regulatory sanctions involving corporations).
To fine a municipal body is to remove revenue from the 
operating capital of that municipality. Therefore, a substantial 
fine would be amortized through higher taxes, and/or decreased 
programs. The individuals become the recipients of the sanction.
The trial judge in v. City of Ouesnel (1987) indicated 
that a small fine would be in order based on the fact that it 
would be paid by the taxpayers. This position leads to 
ineffective prosecution of municipal bodies and potentially could 
be an impetus for the Ministry to be reluctant to formally
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prosecute municipal bodies when environmental wrongdoing has 
occurred. This in turn pushes the negotiation process of 
Ministry/polluter interaction deeper into the recesses of the 
closet and away from public scrutiny.
f) The amount of Remorse exhibited by an offender is a mitigating
factor in sentencing. This factor gives rise to various forms of
subtle theatrics in the courtroom and in the actions of the
accused. The scenario is commonplace in all trial situations.
The defendant is instructed by counsel to attend the trial in
dress clothes, sporting a "new unoffensive haircut." The same
theatrics have been remodelled for use in environmental
situations. Post-infraction undertakings by the corporation or
individual are factors considered as remorseful (Training
programs are set up for employees; expenditures on abatement
technology increase.). Large, high profile corporations can even
capitalize on environmental expenditures in terms of advertising
(witness, Inco Canada Inc. winter 1991 ads on CBC).
R. v. United Keno Hill Mines, surfaces again as a reference
for this factor. The trial judge states:
Speed in rectifying problem and cleaning up pollution, 
voluntary reporting, and corporate presence at trial 
are all evidence of remorse.
He continues:
The personal attendance of responsible senior corporate 
officials in -court and their testimony substantiate 
corporate remorse, contrition, and good faith in 
desiring to resolve outstanding problems, and 
accordingly has a positive impact on sentencing.
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This belief sets a precedent for legitimating legal 
theatrics. The presence of high ranking corporate officials at 
trial should not in any way reflect remorse. The presence is 
probably more indicative of the degree of concern over the 
potential finding of guilt. Extending this logic, the presence 
of the accused in a murder trial should indicate remorse. The 
inclusion of such an opinion as that of Stuart CJ in the United 
Keno Hill Mines case official report sets the stage for corporate 
offenders to be present at trial for the sole purpose of 
extracting leniency from the sentencing official. Defence 
counsel will undoubtedly reference such attendance in speaking to 
sentence. These factors are not conducive to environmental 
protection, or to the functioning of a fair, equitable legal 
system. They merely add elements that corrupt and cloud the 
administration of justice.
g) The use of a guilty plea as a mitigating factor in sentencing 
becomes a question of jurisprudential ethics in opposition to 
promoting expediency of process. If the plea of guilty 
consistently provides for a lenient sentence, does this not 
induce an offender to abandon his/her defence if a poor balance 
of probabilities exists in reference to acquittal (regardless of 
actual guilt or innocence)? All accused should be able to defend 
their actions or the charge before them without fear of being 
sanctioned for anything more than the original offence. In 
reality, however, the absence of a guilty plea in a trial where
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the accused is convicted can dictate a more severe penalty than 
an accused who pleads guilty given identical circumstances.
In L. v. FMC of Canada (1985) the trial judge stated that, 
"guilty plea is not a factor; to treat as such would be to 
penalize for pleading not guilty." In JL_ v. Panarctic_Oils Ltd. 
(1982) "The corporation has the right to defend the charge 
against it; no inference should be drawn from its decision to do 
so."
If guilty pleas are considered, the victim can become the 
small economically vulnerable corporation, or presumably 
individuals. These parties, devoid of the economic ability to 
pursue costly legal representation for extensive periods (as can 
be the case with long environmental hearings), may choose to 
plead guilty and accept a smaller fine. These cases may, at 
first glance, seem insignificant in reference to the amount of 
time and/or the degree of environmental degradation. However, 
the issue is one of ethical concern. The situation creates a 
"criminalization" effect by labelling accused who may not 
rightfully deserve such distinction.
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VII THE CASE OF R. v. THE CITY OF SAULT STE. MARIE
The Sault Ste. Marie case harbours the distinction of being
the most influential decision for environmental law in the modern
era in Canada, as witnessed by its frequency of reference in
subsequent decisions. The case became a testament to the
functioning of the law. The decision heralded the delineation of
a new set of legal categories. The decision specifically applied
to environmental offenses (given its content); however, it has
had effect on both criminal and standard regulatory offenses:
In recognizing that the public interest is paramount 
over the right of the individual to carry on activities 
that put the environment at risk, the Sault Ste. Marie, 
case implicitly extends this principle to sentencing as 
well (Swaigen and Bunt, 1985:9).
The city of Sault Ste. Marie was charged under s. 32(1) of 
the OWRA. "That it did discharge, or cause to be discharged, or 
permitted to be discharged, or deposited materials into Cannon 
Creek and Root River, between March 13th, 1972 and September 
11th, 1972."
The city had entered into an agreement on November 18, 1970 
with Cherokee Disposal and Construction Co. Ltd. for the disposal 
of all refuse originating in the city. Under the agreement, 
Cherokee furnished a sanitary landfill site which bordered Cannon 
Creek, which in turn runs into the Root River. Pollution of both 
water courses resulted and Cherokee was convicted of a breach of 
s. 32(1) of the OWRA. The question before the Supreme Court was 
whether the city was also guilty of an offense.
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The city was acquitted in Provincial Court, but was
convicted following a trial 'de novo' on a Crown appeal. A
further appeal to the Divisional Court by the city was allowed
and the conviction was overturned. The Court of Appeal for
Ontario on yet another appeal directed a new trial. The Supreme
Court of Canada granted leave to the Crown to appeal and leave to
the city to cross-appeal (Jeffery 1987, 40 C.C.C ( ) ) ,
"The importance of the decision lies in the court's handling
of the question of mens rea" (Jeffery 1987:62).
The court discussed the original two categories of offenses
and their application to public welfare offenses:
Generally in classifying offenses with respect to mens 
rea the choice has been between requiring proof of full 
mens rea or making the offense absolute in the sense 
that a conviction will follow on proof merely that the 
accused committed the actus reus of the prohibited act, 
there being no relevant mental elements (Dickson J, in 
R. v. Sault Ste Marie') .
Absolute liability has been imposed on public welfare offenses in
the past, based on the belief that high standards of care are
more likely to be upheld if the actors know that ignorance or
mistake of fact will not excuse them of liability.for the act.
It was believed that the social ends to be achieved were of such
importance as to override the unfortunate by-product of punishing
those who may be free of moral turpitude (R. v. Sault Ste.
Marie).
Dickson J. in the Sault decision viewed the arguments 
against absolute liability as more persuasive. "Absolute 
liability violates fundamental principles of penal liability."
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Given this position, Dickson J. presented that the doctrine
proceeds on the assumption that the defendant could avoid the
prima facie offence (absolute liability) through the exercise of
reasonable care, and he is given the opportunity of establishing,
if he can, that he did in fact exercise such care.
Previously, in absolute liability cases, due diligence was
admissible when speaking to sentence, therefore Dickson J.
believed "the evidence might just as well be heard when
considering guilt." Liability in this case rests upon control
and the opportunity to prevent (e.g., that the accused could
have, and should have prevented the pollution).
In noting the difficulty for the prosecution in proving mens
rea and the corresponding ethical dilemma of absolute liability
coupled with the gravity of pollution offenses as public welfare
concerns, the following was created:
Dickson J. The correct approach in my opinion is to 
relieve the Crown of the burden of proving mens rea 
given the virtual impossibility in most regulatory 
cases of proving wrongful intention. In a normal case, 
the accused alone will have knowledge of what he has 
done to avoid the breach and it is not improper to 
expect him to come forward with the evidence of due 
diligence. This is particularly so when it is alleged, 
for example, that pollution was caused by activities of 
a large and complex corporation. Equally there is 
nothing wrong with rejecting absolute liability and 
admitting the defence of reasonable care.
In such a doctrine it is not a requirement of the
prosecution to prove negligence. It is, however, open to the
defendant to prove all reasonable care was taken, therefore
establishing that he/she/it was not negligent. It is ethical to
place this burden of proof on the defendant because they are the
75
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
only ones with the means of proof. The fairness of this burden 
is underscored when one looks at the alternative which is 
absolute liability which denies any defence. The prosecution 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the prohibited act. The defendant must only establish on the 
balance of probabilities that he has a defence of reasonable 
care.
Dickson J. continued:
I conclude, for the reasons I have sought to express, 
that there are compelling grounds for the recognition 
of three categories of offenses, rather than the 
traditional two.
1. Offenses in which mens rea. consisting of some 
positive state of mind such as intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness, must be proved by the prosecution either 
as an inference from the nature of the act committed, 
or by additional evidence.
2. Offenses in which there is no necessity for the 
prosecution to prove the existence of mens rea; the 
doing of the prohibited act prima facie imparts the 
offence, leaving it open to the accused to avoid 
liability by proving that he took all reasonable care.
The defence will be available if the accused reasonably 
believed in a mistaken set of facts which, if true 
would render the act or omission innocent, or if he 
took all reasonable steps to avoid the particular 
event. These offenses may properly be called offenses 
of strict liability.
3. Offenses of absolute liability where it is not open 
to the accused to exculpate himself by showing that he 
was free of fault.
Offenses which are criminal in the true sense (therefore, 
within the Criminal Code not Provincial legislation (see Dickson 
J. p.356)) "as valid provincial legislation does not create an 
offence which is criminal in the true sense" fall in the first 
category. Public welfare offenses would prima facie, be in the
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second category. They are not subject to the presumption of full
mens rea. An offence of this type would fall in the first
category only if such words as "wilfully," "with intent,"
"knowingly" or "intentionally" are contained in the statutory
provisions creating the offence. On the other hand, the
principle that punishment should, in general, not be inflicted on
those without fault applies. Offenses of absolute liability
would be those in respect of which the legislature had made it
clear that guilt would follow proof merely of the proscribed act:
The overall regulatory pattern adopted by the 
legislature, the subject matter of the legislation, the 
importance of the penalty and the precision of the 
language_used will be primary considerations in 
determining whether the offence falls into the third 
category (Sault Ste. Marie^S*) .
Dickson J. allows this clear interpretation in reference to the
environment:
Pollution offenses are undoubtedly public welfare 
offenses enacted in the interests of public health.
There is thus no presumption of full mens rea.
In the concluding statements regarding the appeals of Sault
Ste. Marie Dickson J. elaborated on the wording of S. 32(1) OWRA:
The 'permitting' aspect of the offence centres on the 
defendant's passive lack of interference or, in other 
words, its failure to prevent an occurrence which it 
ought to have foreseen (p.377).
Again in reference to a municipality:
A municipality cannot slough off responsibility by 
contracting out the work. It is in a position to 
control those whom it hires to carry out garbage 
disposal operations, and to supervise the activity, 
either through the provisions of the contract or by 
municipal by-laws. It fails to do so at its peril 
(p.377).
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The Sault Ste. Marie case has been extremely important, 
however, the decision has also created new dilemmas. It has 
cleared up in some regards, distinctions between the three 
categories of offenses, but in doing so has left a substantial 
amount of judicial baggage. The decision was not far-reaching 
enough. It is still necessary for the courts to look at a 
variety of factors (outlined by Dickson J,) such as, ’’precision 
of language used," "importance of penalty" and "subject matter 
of legislation," in order to determine whether the offence falls 
into the second or third category (Jeffery 1987:6*).
"The category of strict liability has effectively made 
prosecution more difficult for the EPA and OWRA" (Jeffery, 
1987:66).
The advancing of the due diligence defense under the strict 
liability category shifts the burden of proof to the defence. If 
it cannot prove, on a balance of probabilities that it took 
reasonable care, conviction will result. The regulatory 
enforcement agent (MOE in Ontario) is given the increased 
pressure of obtaining evidence in anticipation of the due 
diligence defence. If the defence i.-- adopted by the accused, the 
prosecution must be prepared to rebut it. It has been stated (in 
support of reversing the burden of proof) that generally the 
proof of diligence/negligence is only available to the accused. 
Literally, the issue has been addressed, procedurally. One finds 
the prosecution still in search of this elusive evidence in order 
to be prepared for rebuttal:
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The training programs of both the Ministry [of the 
Environment] and the Ontario Police College emphasize 
the necessity of constructing a case with the view to 
establishing whether or not the alleged offender was 
negligent.
Part of the problem stems from the fact that there is 
no procedure analogous to that of discovery in civil 
actions which enables the prosecution, first, to know 
in advance that the defence of due diligence will be 
raised and second, if it is raised, to know upon what 
facts the defence will be based (Jeffery, 1987:68).
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VIII The Criminal Law and Environmental Protection
In the previous sections two levels of political-legal 
intervention have been alluded to in reference to environmental 
wrongdoing. First, regulatory offenses (Provincial Acts) and the 
criminal law, 'in the true sense' (Canadian Criminal CodeT.
Criminal Code offenses are traditionally viewed as more 
stigmatizing, and carrying harsher penalties than provincial 
regulatory strategies. It is therefore understandable why a call 
has been made to include environmental offenses in the Criminal 
Code. and to prosecute offenders through that medium. The 
benefits of such a move seem clear given the previous assumption, 
however what are the real outcomes of a stronger reliance on the 
criminal law?
...that calls for increased penalties are the knee-jerk 
reactions of those not familiar with the actual 
situation (Webb, 1988:31).
In reference to the Australian situation:
deficiencies ir; the knee-jerk political reactions to 
environmental pollution concerns, such as the 
Environmental Offenses and Penalties Bill. The 
interest for criminal lawyers is the predictable appeal 
to the symbolic force of the criminal law without, 
however, any appraisal of the likely outcome 
(Franklin, 1990:1).
The ’’symbolic force" of the criminal law is the 
philosophical variable that attracts the attention.of the 
uninformed. Claims of harsher penalties via criminalization are 
a convenient tool for sweetening political rhetoric by policy 
makers. Given the perception of 'criminal' as more severe, and 
therefore more effective, the public is appeased by an
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administration "getting tough" with polluters through this means.
Politically advantageous headlines are easier to secure when
announcements can be made regarding increasing penalties. In
Australia, Franklin notes that headlines were numerous involving
the proposed Environmental Offenses Bill that sought to
criminalize pollution offenses:
Bosses who pollute face jail and we are just going to 
go for the jugular of anyone breaking the law. We will 
take no prisoners (1990).
These headlines were delivered in speeches by the New South Wales
Minister of the Environment. It therefore becomes evident that
many of the same misconceptions concerning environmental legal
strategies held by the public are also held by the political
spokes-people:
Public perception and political response proceed on a 
limited understanding of the prosecution and sentencing 
process (Franklin, 1990:5).
The rigid procedural necessities governing the functioning
of the criminal law make it a slow performer in dealing with a
multi-dimensional problem such as environmental wrongdoing:
The criminal fine has been recognized as being too 
blunt a weapon, and the criminal process too cumbersome 
and onerous, and not well suited to corporations and 
other business organizations (Franklin, 1990:8).
The components of the criminal law make it a less desirable forum
for combatting environmental degradation. The components are as
follows: First, in order for an offence to be truly criminal two
elements must be present, (actus rsus. and mens rea). These are
simply the criminal act, and the criminal mind:
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The requirement for actus reus and mens rea constitutes 
such a basic principle within our criminal law that it 
must form, if only in the most general terms, the 
starting point for any rational exposition of that law 
(Law Reform Commission of Canada (LRCC) 1982:21).
Criminal liability is created, in part only when "the
commission of conduct coming within the definition of an offence
ensues" (LRCC 1982). The act in environmental cases is often
quite clear within the regulatory framework, however, the proof
process involving the act in a criminal trial could be
increasingly difficult. "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt" can be
a challenge when one considers such situations as proving that ,
dead fish in a large body of water resulted from the particular
pollution in question. The presence of multiple variables can
often be enough to create "reasonable doubt" in the criminal
sense. However, in the regulatory forum of Provincial offenses:
In many cases polluters plead guilty, thereby relieving 
the Crown of the burden of proving an offence took 
place (Webb, 1988:33).
The mental element emerged from the principle "actus non facit 
reum nisi mens sit rea." In order to be guilty it was not 
sufficient to do a wrongful act. The accused also had to do it 
with a wrongful state of mind (LRCC 1982:22).
Proof of this component, beyond a reasonable doubt, becomes 
a nearly impossible task for the Crown within the context of 
environmental wrongdoing. The criticism of these two central 
tenants of criminal law is not an all-encompassing one. In the 
context of 'traditional' crimes such procedural inflexibilities 
have evolved via the common law tradition as mechanisms for
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ensuring judicial fairness and effectiveness:
Pollution does not resemble the typical criminal 
violation which courts are most familiar with because 
the activity of polluting often defies reduction to 
simple legal formulae (Webb, 1988:33).
It is this uniqueness that dictates a different focus be
initiated in regard to hearing environmental cases.
The knee-jerk reaction of criminalizing environmenta.'1.
legislation in order to "get tough" can have the inverse effect.
The criminal law would ensure that (given the proof requirements)
convictions would be harder to attain than from within the
present regulatory strategy:
If a court concludes that a pollution offence is 
criminal, so that mens rea must be proven, it can be 
very difficult to secure convictions, since many acts 
of pollution are not deliberate (for example, spills) 
and are perpetrated by corporations (In which case, 
establishing intent for a corporate body can be an 
extremely onerous task.) (Webb, 1988:34).
In support of this empirical connection, Swaigen and Bunt 
comment chat "Pollution offenses have been called closely 
analogous to white collar corporate crime" (1985:41). Given 
that point, the criminological literature on white collar crime 
suggests an inherent complexity within the structure of the 
corporation that provides a difficult obstacle for legal 
prosecution (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Sutherland, 1949; Yeager, 
1987).
Procedures within the criminal law can also play a role in 
obstructing effective prosecutions. The issue of disclosure of 
information could be a barrier in environmental cases. In 
criminal cases the Crown must disclose its case but the accused
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can maintain silence. Search warrants are also necessary to
obtain evidence. In civil matters (regulatory, Provincial
legislation) mutual discovery and production of documents are
considered unexceptionable:
The complexity of corporate structure, business 
arrangements and pollution control systems make it 
impossible for the Crown to prove negligence (Swaigen 
and Bunt, 1985:43).
The corporate actor is often the only one with the knowledge
of what took place in reference to pollution activity. Therefore
to burden the Crown with proving, or even discussing the 
occurrence without disclosure, would render the prosecution 
process totally ineffective.
Reliance on the criminal process could also limit the scope 
of sentencing options. The criminal law, through its blunt 
nature, can be effective in its punitive capacity, however, its 
ability to provide for compensation or restitution to victims may 
be hampered by the belief “that criminal courts are not a
collection agency" (Swaigen and Bunt 1985:43). The progression
of environmental consciousness and environmental legal thinking 
may in time begin to take a less homocentric view of 
environmental concern. This may give rise to a desire to 
implement an ecocentric sentencing policy, wherein restitution 
and compensation to non-human actors may be a part of the 
process. The civil, regulatory law provides a more receptive 
forum for such concerns.
Criminal prosecutions foster an adversarial relationship 
between enforcer and offender. In the case of environmental
84
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
wrongdoing between the MOE and Industry or individual, a
cooperative, receptive relationship would appear to be a
prerequisite for an effective long-term strategy for
environmental protection. Closing off communication lines
(disclosure, compliance schedules, technology development) can
only drive activity underground further away from scrutiny. An
industrial offender, faced with a criminal prosecution, would
understandably be hesitant to report a spill to the appropriate
authorities. This would cause cleanup activity to be delayed at
the expense of the natural environment. A focus on detection by
Ministry officials would be required, given the lack of
cooperation. Detection, to a point of certainty that would
create even a remote level of deterrence, would require thousands
of person hours and vast, illogical amounts of public spending.
An increase in public funds to combat environmental degradation
is not in itself illogical. To target such funds towards an
adversarial method, is illogical:
...because abatement often cannot be achieved 
overnight, and frequently necessitates close 
government/industry cooperation as solutions are worked 
out, again it does not resemble the typical police- 
criminal relationships courts are most familiar with 
(Webb, 1988:33).
The cooperative relationship between government (MOE) and 
Industry must be encouraged in order to implement an effective 
new focus towards environmental policy. It has been stated that 
public concern is present and is escalating. A solid 
relationship that is open for consultation and technological 
development under the mandate of environmental protection,
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potentially has support in the form of revenue from a concerned
voting public. Methods, such as grants or loans to implement
abatement technologies, and incentives for research will have to
replace a mentality driven by the illusive deterrence theory via
punitive criminal sanctions. Prosecutions will undoubtedly have
a continual place in the framework given the propensity for non-
normative behaviour to occur in defiance of all strategies. An
effective prosecution strategy can play a minor role in
complementing the overall goal within a regulatory framework, not
an adversarial criminal legal forum:
As a general comment, proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
may be a sensible burden to be observed in typical 
criminal cases, but in the scientifically imprecise 
world of pollution, it means that a great many
potentially harmful substances will elude the court's
grasp. The criminal courts are accustomed to the 
immediate and demonstrable harm and risk associated 
with traditional criminal behaviour: criminal courts 
may not be the most appropriate forum for checking and 
controlling the less obvious and less tangible harm 
associated with many modern pollutants (Webb, 1988:40).
Swaigen and Bunt in summarizing their position on the issue
state:
We doubt that the determinants lie in the words "civil" 
or "criminal" but if they do, then the characterization 
of environmental offenses as civil supports our 
recommendations (1985:44).
Franklin, in analyzing Australian environmental law also supports
the position:
Above ail there is the instrumental justification that 
the civil law encompasses an array of remedies, 
including fines, damages and injunctions which are 
more flexible, interventionist and effective in 
addressing the overarching objectives of pollution 
control policy (1990:8).
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IX EXPLANATION OF THE DATA SET
The tables and data contained in this section have been 
derived from a computer-generated listing of the Ontario Ministry 
of the Environment's prosecutions for the year 1989. The cases 
in the listing are ones that have been 'closed' within the year 
1989. Therefore, the legal process may have been initiated, and 
the offence committed prior to 1989.
The data set contained (1) a file number, (2) the offender's 
title (e.g., R. v. Stelco or R. v. P.Smithf. (3) the legislation 
contravened (EPA, OWRA, PA), (4) the plea issued by the offender 
(5) the disposition (guilty, or not guilty),and (6) the amount of 
fine.
In common with data sets from public agencies, various 
information was missing from certain files. On the whole, the 
data set allows for an adequate view of one particular year of 
prosecution behaviour by the Ministry of the Environment.
The author acquired the data after contacting the Ministry 
in October 1990. He was originally told that the information was 
not available, however an MOE records official sent the printout. 
The individual was contacted twice subsequent to receiving the 
data for the purpose of explaining various recording categories 
and in order to validate the data's scope.
This section containing the 1989 data, will consist of four 
tables expanding the information. The tables will allow for an 
explanation of the four aspects contained in the set that are of 
primary illustrative value for creating a window into the actual
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behaviour of both enforcement (regulatory) body and sentencing 
official (disposition and fine amount).
First, the individual and corporate offenses will be broken 
down in reference to the fine ranges imposed. Second, the 
occurrence levels of the legislation will be presented in order 
to show which type of offence is most often being brought to 
trial. Third, the concept of corporate actor liability will be 
explored by shov?ing an estimate of individuals charged via direct 
connection with a corporate offence. Fourth, the total picture 
will be tabulated illustrating the total fines, charges, and 
charged entities for the year 1989.
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THE CORPORATE OFFENDER
For the purposes of the analysis of the data set, the 
corporate offender has been defined by name. A perusal of MOE 
prosecution files shows that corporations are listed by corporate 
name and individuals by an individual surname. Offenders were 
also deemed to be corporate if, after the title, Inc. or Ltd. was 
present.
In 1989 the MOE prosecuted a total of 141 offenders, of 
which 90 were corporate entities. These 90 corporate offenders 
who were 'selected' for prosecution were assessed a total of 195 
separate charges. The total fines levied against all convicted 
offenders amounted to $525,557.50.
In any realm of law enforcement or regulation, the 
enforcement levels are extremely low in reference to occurrences. 
However, in the case of enforcing environmental standards, the 
rate of enforcement is minuscule. It is logically obvious that 
there were considerably more than 90 corporations that had 
breached a section of a given Act regulating environmental 
quality. The chosen few, as it were, become little more than 
legitimation tools for government and the MOE. Considering the 
amount of fines, deterrence through prosecution clearly is not 
the mandate. The underlying strategy, either through choice or 
necessity, is negotiation. If one balances the amount of fines 
against the inestimable cost done to the environment and human 
health by all polluters, the corporate fines assessed appear to
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be nothing short of ridiculous.
The previous section outlining the provisional penalties
within the Acts presented a potential for serious fines to be
levied. The picture in actuality is painted with quite a
different colour:
...and yet, for all the fire and brimstone suggested by 
environmental legislation, in reality government has 
generally proceeded in a much quieter, less adversarial 
manner. What legislation suggests government is doing, 
and what government is actually doing have often been 
two different things (Webb, 1988:17).
It is interesting to note that while the approximate
corporate fines for Ontario were $525,557, the environmentally
infamous Exxon Corporation from New York tabled a three month,
first quarter profit of 2.24 billion dollars (Globe and Mail,
April 25/91). Exxon settled for 1 billion dollars for their
Valdez spill on the Pacific Coast; however, the actual criminal
fine levied was 100 million dollars. United States District
Judge Russell Holland called the fine "a licencing fee” (USA
Today, April 25/91).
A simple analysis shows that fines are clearly not a
deterrent to major corporations. Critics of this logic may
allude to innovative sentencing, such as the sanction of public
disclosure. The Exxon spill was highly publicized world wide,
and environmental groups attempted to tarnish the Exxon image.
The profit increase above would obviously be a testament to
innovative marketing strategies being superior to public
disclosure as a sanction. The Tylenol case of the early 1980's
is also a witness to the power of corporate recovery after
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negative publicity.
Out of the 195 total corporate charges, full data was
available for 147. In 94 charges convictions were secured,
resulting in a mean fine amount of 5,591 dollars. Only one
charge elicited the significant fine of 70,000 dollars. This
fine was 40,000 dollars higher than the next highest amount. It
is notable that the fine ranges available for sentencing
officials (as outlined previously), became quite insignificant
when looking at the average fine. It is quite legitimate to
state that the upper levels of the fine structure are reserved
for the "worst case," however, when fines are skewed so severely
to the bottom, a focus on deterrence (see sentencing principles)
can be nothing more than a device for academic debate with little
practical application. Of the 147 charges with full data, 53
were either dismissed or withdrawn (36%).
An interesting aspect of the corporate data that surfaced
during study was the size and wealth of the charged corporation.
If corporate influence on government is proportional to the size
and power of the corporation, one would expect to find a
disproportionate number of smaller companies represented in the
prosecution list. Galbraith states:
By virtue of their ability to influence their economic 
and political environment, rather than simply reacting 
to it, such large corporations have more in common with 
governments than with the atomistic, competitive 
producers whose existence is an implicit premise of 
much economic theory (1975:38).
The task of discerning the corporate power variable was 
beyond the scope of this research, however, it would be a
91 V
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
valuable focus for further Canadian research (noting that Yeager, 
1987 used firm strength measured by assets in his study of the 
United States EPA).
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Given the previous description of the data set, a charged 
offender was deemed to be an 'individual7 based on an absence of 
corporate connections, either through the file number or the name 
of the accused; that being, Kilpest Services was labelled a 
corporate offender while J. Smith would be seen as an individual. 
Undoubtedly, the majority of individuals charged by the MOE 
committed the alleged offence during some form or degree of 
business activity. An independent contractor, a one person 
haulage company, a small landscaping business, would be examples. 
These 'individuals7 may have been acting under an agreement of an 
exchange of services, however, were unlikely to have considerable 
staff or a management hierarchy.
The environmental regulatory process is one of negotiation, 
often compromise between regulator (MOE) and offender.
"...relying on formal sanctions only as a last resort" (Webb, 
1988:18). This unscrutinized give and take of time, compliance 
schedules, and effluent limits becomes the fulcrum of a balancing 
act between industry and government (Sabatier, 1975; Schrecker, 
1984; Webb, 1988; Yeager, 1987).
Since formal sanctions (prosecutions) are used as a "last 
resort" what ability did the offenders possess who managed to 
avoid prosecution? Put another way; what inability did the 
offenders have who found their way into the formal legal 
machinery? Are these offenders all inadequate in their
94
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negotiation process? Were they all persistently disregarding
Ministry guidelines?
One must remember that the MOE is an extension of state
control and regulation into the social/industrial sphere. The
MOE faces a twofold crisis. First, it must legitimate itself to
the state as a whole, based on its effectiveness of functioning,
via its mandates. Second, being an appendage of the state it
must assist in the legitimation of the state as a whole. The
legitimation of the state itself becomes an issue of crisis
management in late capitalist systems (Offe, 1984). Offe
illuminates this management issue via his concept of "negative
subordination":
In negative subordination the dominance of the economic 
system over the two subsystems (the other being the 
political-administrative) depends on whether— given the 
possibility of the partial functional irrelevance of 
these two systems for the economic system— the 
boundaries between the respective systems can be 
stabilized; so that the economic system is able to 
prevent the alternative organizational principles of 
the state power systems from interfering with its own 
domain of the production and distribution of goods 
(Offe, 1984:39).
The variables in the current issue (MOE and offender) can 
fit clearly into Offe's conception. Environmental regulation is 
clearly counter productive to the functioning of industry. State 
intervention via MOE into business activities, blurs the lines 
between the "subsystems." Given that environmental protection is 
a social welfare consideration carrying increasing importance in 
voter mobilization (as established previously), the state is 
under the burden of legitimating itself to the greater
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constituency through regulation of environmental wrongdoing. The 
state, possessing the need to foster economic growth, delegates 
responsibility for environmental regulation to a peripheral 
ministry (MOE). Resources are allocated from the central 
government to the MOE in levels that conveniently dictate its 
ability to function at various levels of enforcement and 
regulation. Therefore central budgets become a useful tocl for 
covertly controlling the activities of peripheral appendages, 
while overtly maintaining a certain level of legitimacy with the 
populace:
An agency with the most aggressive intentions may be 
forced into emphasizing negotiation, and into applying 
sanctions with a severity and frequency that varies 
inversely with the size and wealth of the offender 
(Shrecker, 1984:13).
Yeager also touches on this point in his work on the U.S.A, EPA:
Research shows that federal agencies are often 
reluctant to engage corporate adversaries in legal 
battles, preferring instead to negotiate with them and 
administer symbolic penalties, if any. For lack of 
political and economic muscle smaller firms may be more 
likely to feel the full force of the law (1987:333).
Shrecker's thoughts in reference to agency resources are
helpful in explaining the presence of a substantial number of
'individuals' and small companies in the 1989 data.
In that year the Ontario MOE prosecuted 51 individuals.
This total represented 36 per cent of all charged entities. The
total charges issued to these 51 individuals totalled 84. As
with the corporate information, certain files lacked various
aspects of the case. Therefore full information regarding
disposition and fine amount was available for 55 of the 84
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charges, or 65.5 per cent. Of the 55 known charges, 39 resulted 
in a conviction. The mean fine amount over these 39 convictions 
was $2740.45. This mean represents approximately 49 per cent of 
the mean for corporations. It becomes clear that based on 
"potential" resources, the impact of the average fine per charge 
is considerably more penetrating financially on the convicted 
individual than the corporation. (Although financial data is not 
available it is logical to assume that corporate resources would 
be more extensive than individual financial capabilities.)
Removal of the extreme high values in both the individual data 
and the corporate data still generates the figure that 
corporations are paying only 69 per cent more than individuals. 
The adjusted means become $1458.40 for individuals and $4846.36 
for corporations.
The absolute value is extremely inequitable, but compounding 
the inequity is the ability of larger companies to absorb and 
amortize the costs of regulatory fines, passing on costs 
discretely to the consumer. This can be done by corporations in 
less competitive environments. Smaller firms and individuals do 
not have this luxury as they lack monopolistic power (Yeager, 
1987).
The 55 known charges resulted in 16 being withdrawn or 
dismissed (29 per cent).
The actual presence of individuals and corporations in 
reference to the mean fine levels would tend to be supported by 
Swaigen and Bunt's perceptions:
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The vast majority of cases that come before the courts 
do not involve large, powerful corporations, but small 
businesses, whose ability to pay is limited 
(1985:45).
Swaigen and Bunt end there, they do not question the lack of 
representation in the envii'onmental cases by "large powerful 
corporations.11 It would be difficult to believe that such 
corporations are not breaking environmental laws, that many of 
the same occurrences are not taking place as with the charged 
smaller businesses.
The sentencing official undoubtedly takes into consideration 
the "ability to pay" when imposing a fine. Therefore smaller 
fines (relatively) are levied to individuals and smaller 
corporations. This behaviour by the courts is quite universal in 
the Canadian setting (Swaigen and Bunt, 1985). Given that this 
is true, the prevalence of low fines per charge in the 1989 data 
could indicate an absence of larger corporations. This could be 
an indication of the ability of influential corporations to avoid 
prosecution and to extend the negotiation process. This is not 
to say that Ministry officials necessarily neglect the actions of 
larger corporate actors, only that alternative courses of action 
may be more readily chosen when dealing with powerful corporate 
offenders:
Larger more powerful corporations— because of their 
great stock of legal and technical expertise— will more 
often use formal legal procedures to negotiate 
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Enforcement agents consider the larger corporations 
more likely to be socially responsible, and to make 
good faith efforts at compliance (1987:341).
All of these negotiations take place far in advance of
prosecutions, and involve relatively formidable legal adversaries
for the MOE to do battle with.
From the data nine individuals could be 'clearly7 linked to
a larger corporate offender (based on common file numbers and
relevant sections of the Acts). These individuals could be
directors or major employees of "directing mind." These nine
individuals were involved in a total of 15 charges. The 15
received convictions on only six of the charges. The individuals
connected to the corporate offenses received dismissed or
withdrawn charges on nine of the 15 charges. This number is
significantly higher than the rates of dismissal for the other
categories of offender. This could support Yeager7s claims of
increased legal resources and influence from corporations,
affecting the dispositions of the courts in regard to the
individual corporate actor.
Violated Sections of the Relevant Acts 
In the 1989 Data Set, the representation of the three main 
Acts were distributed as would be expected. The EPA, being the 
foremost legislative regulatory statement in the province, was 
represented the most often, followed by the OWRA and the 
Pesticides Act. The data allowed for the analysis of 178 known 
charges where legislative content was listed.
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The EPA was represented 116 times or 65.2 per cent. Section
13 (1), being the blanket prohibition on contaminants was
breached 51 times or 44 per cent of the EPA violations:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or the 
regulations, no person shall discharge a contaminant or 
cause or permit the discharge of a contaminant into the 
natural environment that causes or is likely to cause 
an adverse effect (R.S.O. 1980, cl41, s.l3(l)).
Section 39 represented 21 charges or 18.1 per cent of EPA
violations. This section is a prohibition against depositing
waste in a site that has not been issued a certificate of
approval.
Section 27 represented 15 charges or 12.9 per cent of the 
violations. This section will undoubtedly become increasingly 
important based on the current situations regarding municipal 
waste management facilities, and proposed limits, or user fees on 
garbage pickup.
Section 27
No person shall use, operate, establish, alter, 
enlarge, or extend,
(a) a waste management system; or
(b) a waste disposal site,
unless a certificate of approval or provisional 
certificate of approval therefore has been issued by 
the director and except in accordance with any 
conditions set out in such certificate 
(R.S.O. 1980, C.141, S.27.).
Section 146 is in the penalties area of the Act. It states 
that it is an offence to not comply with either a control order 
or certificate of approval. This section was violated five times 
or 4.3 per cent.
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Twenty four, or 20.7 per cent of the EPA violations were 
under various other sections of the Act.
The OWRA
The OWRA was represented in the data by 47 charges or 26.4
per cent of the known total charges. A breakdown of the 47
charges revealed that 35 or 74.5 per cent were under section 16
(both 16(1) and 16(2) were represented in this figure). This
section is the comparable section to the EPA's 13(1):
Every person that discharges or causes or permits the 
discharge of any material of any kind into or in any 
water or on any shore or bank thereof or into any place 
that may impair the quality of the water of any waters 
is guilty of an offence 
(R.S.O. 1980, c.361, s.16(1)).
Section 16(2) continues to expand 16(1) in that if any 
discharge occurs "out of the normal course of events" the 
Ministry is to be notified, forthwith.
The OWRA was cited 13 other times or 27.6 per cent, under 
various sections of the Act.
The Pesticides Act
The Pesticides Act was cited on 15 occasions, or 8.4 per 
cent of the total charges. There were four sections of the Act 
referred to; s.6, s.5(1), s.5(2) and s.4(b).
Section 6 is prohibiting the sale or transfer of pesticides 
unless they are classified and a licence is obtained to do so.
Section 5(1) prohibits an individual to perform 
exterminations unless in possession of a licence to do so and
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using a pesticide prescribed under that licence.
Section 5(2) elaborates further to prohibit the operation of
an actual extermination business without a licence.
Section 4 is a discharge prohibition:
No person, whether acting or not acting under the 
authority of a licence or permit under this Act or an 
exemption under the regulations, shall discharge or 
cause or permit the discharge of a pesticide or of any 
substance or thing containing a pesticide into the 
environment that,
4(b) causes or is likely to cause injury or damage to 
property or to plant or animal life greater than the 
injury or damage, if any, that would necessarily result 
from the proper use of the pesticide (R.S.O. 1980, 
c.376, s.4(b)).
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Totals from the 1989 HOE data 
Total charges 295
Total corporate charges 195
Total individual charges 84
Charges to individuals connected
to corporate offence 16





Corporate charges withdrawn 53
Individual charges withdrawn 16
Total amount of corporate fines $525,557.50
Total amount of individual fines $106,877.68
Total fines $632,435.18
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The preceding section has illuminated an actual set of 
outcomes within Ontario's environmental/legal forum (1989). The
data allowed a window to be cut into the size and type of 
sanctions issued in the province for the given time period. The
data did not however allow one to dissect the motivations or 
opinions of the sentencing official involved in these decisions. 
The particular data set was hard data and not amenable to probing 
or question beyond statistical description or inference.
The second section of analysis within the thesis explores 
the issues not present in the previous data, as well as expanding 
others. The following data set has been derived from responses 
to questionnaires by the people actually (at times) involved in 
the sentencing recorded in the previous sections data.
The questionnaire was developed to look critically at 
sentencing disparity between sentencing officials by keeping the 
cases and case information constant between respondents. The 
questionnaire also allowed the respondents to make general 
qualitative comments on various aspects of the system.
The three hypothetical cases were constructed to contain 
certain variables or sets of conditions that could later be 
explored based on the respondents' comments regarding the 
particular case. These variables and conditions will be 
discussed in the following pages. The full case descriptions can 
be found in the appendix section.
The total number of respondents to the study was ten of a 
possible 28.
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X DESCRIPTIONS OF KEY ELEMENTS 
WITHIN THE QUESTIONNAIRE DATA SET
Case #1
The case scenario was developed to be a 'classic' industrial 
spill affecting a water source. The case therefore becomes a 
matter regulated by the OWRA.
The date was chosen to coincide with the general fish 
spawning period. The term discharge was used to avoid the 
semantic dilemma of the distinction between 'discharge/ and 
'spill' (see section on cases and defenses). It was believed 
that the sentencing official would evaluate a discharge as more 
serious than a spill. The time period (30 hours) was chosen so
that the discharge could extend into a two day period. It would
be noted if the sentencing official made reference in the 
judgement to a fine per day, or only one fine. In the case 
scenario the Ministry was informed of the spill by plant workers, 
not the corporate administration. This fact may have had bearing 
on the sentencing official in establishing the attitude of the 
corporation.
In the information portion of the case file four variables
were introduced that could have bearing on a judicial sentencing
decision. First the plea of guilty is inevitably a mitigating 
factor:
As in criminal cases, the courts treat guilty pleas in
environmental cases as mitigating factors. There are
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two reasons for this, money saved, and the pleas as an 
indication of contrition (Swaigen and Bunt, 1985:31).
Second, the size of the plant, based on its employment
figure (250) establishes it as a major employer. This variable
could prevent a sentencing official from imposing a financial
burden via a fine that could affect employment in the area.
Third, it was stated that three municipalities down river
had water supplies affected by the spill. This factor was
introduced to increase the gravity of the discharge. It was
believed by the author that such a case should approach the upper
limits of the sanction possibilities, given the harm to fish
species and habitat, as well as the geographical extent of the
damage based on the effect to the downstream municipalities.
Fourth, the fact that the company had been convicted of two
previous environmental charges was introduced to establish its
environmental record for compliance.
108
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Case #2
This case is complementary to cases #1 and #3 in that it 
involved an individual, not associated with a corporate entity.
In the case scenario the individual (Ronald J.) entered into na
verbal agreement, with a small manufacturing plant." The 
phraseology was such as to convey an informal, "under the table" 
type of deal. The contents of the drums were described as a 
"known, highly toxic substance," and "moderately radioactive." 
This was done in order to be quite clear on the potential danger 
of the contents. The location of the quarry was established in 
order to give a degree of remoteness, however still close enough 
to residential areas to maintain the severity of the act. It was 
established by a reliable test that leaching did occur into 
adjacent agricultural land. The use of the quarry as a watering 
area for cattle, under permission from the municipality gave the 
area a tangible purpose. All facts in this case were presented 
to create a wrongdoing of considerable magnitude.
In the information section, facts were given pertaining to
Ronald J.. The not guilty plea once again becomes a matter of 
consideration for the sentencing official. The occupation as 
'seasonally7 employed could convey a certain degree of financial 
instability. The marital status as being single can often be a 
determining factor in establishing a profile of the accused.
Ronald J. had two previous criminal convictions. This was 
presented to give a legal profile of the accused. The statement 
that the prosecution, prior to plea, had informed the accused
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that a penalty would be sought under s.147 (l)c of the EPA, was 
included as a point of law. This allowed the sentencing official 
the option of giving a jail term as the sentence, or part 
thereof.
The inclusion of such a point could have also keyed the 
respondents that the author was expecting such a sentence, 
therefore biasing their decision. The actual effect cannot be 
determined however. The fact that Ronald J. exhibited remorse 
and cited severe economic conditions and unemployment as 
justification for the act was offered as an escape for the 
sentencing official to show bias of economic/personal factors as 
overriding environmental harm.
The fact that the Ministry was alerted to the offence by 
parents of children playing in the area was included to reinforce 
the previous viability of the area as a water source and 
recreational wooded area.
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Case #3
This case returns the focus of the questionnaire to 
corporate environmental behaviour. Once again, this case scenario 
was developed in order for it to approach the upper limits of 
environmental damage. The expectation being, that the sentencing 
official can then have a wider range of possibilities to work 
with, allowing for his/her personal sentencing criteria to be 
illuminated.
Rondel is a family-owned business in a small community (1700 
people), and is the only significant industry in the area, 
employing 36% of the employable workforce. This was presented to 
establish a personal connection to the business, to give the 
industry a greater social purpose than merely the obvious 
economic interests of many corporations. The recent layoffs 
were a fact that establishes economic difficulty.
The second mixing facility at the plant was locked off based 
on a MOE stop order pending improvements to safeguards. It would 
therefore be quite clear to management that the mixer was a 
potential environmental hazard. The subsequent use of the mixer 
was an obvious tradeoff of environmental protection for economic 
gain. The size of the spill was extremely large and its extent 
far reaching. The areas affected were residential, sewage system 
overload, and subsequent forest contamination. Again, this 
establishes an incident of extensive severity.
Cleanup of the town's sewage drainage system is presented to 
be extensive, given the evacuation of 15 residential dwellings.
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The information section highlights a number of potential 
mitigating factors. The guilty plea is a factor again (based on 
previous discussion). The application by Rondel for Federal and 
Provincial aid underscores its economic situation. The 
management's statement that economic costs kept them from 
complying with the previous order illuminates a recent dilemma 
between the costs of abatement technology and economic interests. 
The situation is compounded by the issue of geographic flight to 
areas with less stringent environmental regulations that are 
surfacing in reference to dismantling trade barriers with 
neighbouring countries.
The fact that Rondel is active in community organizations 
solidifies the personal/community ties. Rondel's previous EPA 
violation (although not a spill) should surface as a factor. The 
fact that Rondel did not notify the Ministry of the spill 
"forthwith" should become a factor in sentencing.
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XI SENTENCING DISPARITY
The ten respondents all received the same set of
hypothetical cases and questions, at relatively the same period.
The respondents were all trained sentencing officials, either
presiding JPs or Provincial or District Court Judges (see
demographic data). What logical explanation can be offered to
account for the disparity of sentences between individuals?
(Disparity being differences in sentences between officials.)
The methodological statement noted that by using the
hypothetical cases approach internal validity is maximized given
that identical information is presented to each official.
Therefore, the only plausible explanation for disparity becomes
the "human element" (Hogarth, 1971), or the personal beliefs and
attitudes of the sentencing official:
It is obviously repugnant to one's sense of justice 
that the judgement meted out to an offender should 
depend in large part on a purely fortuitous 
circumstance; namely the personality of the particular 
judge before whom the case happens to come for 
disposition (Mr. Justice Jackson then Attorney-General 
of the United States, in Hogarth, 1971:6).
Hogarth explored five possible relationships that the
sentencing official (magistrate in his study) is involved in that
could have an effect on sentencing behaviour.
The interaction between sentencing officials, via shared
information and communication (on various levels), is a relevant
variable:
Perhaps the greatest social influence in the 
environment of magistrates is their relationship with
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each other. Reciprocal relationships which result out 
of this interaction are likely to produce a tendency 
towards consensus in outlook (Hogarth, 1971:180).
The relationship of magistrates to the Attorney-General's
office was a variable of concern for Hogarth. Hogarth did not
believe that direct, overt influence was exerted on magistrates
by the Attorney General's office, however the functioning of
presiding magistrates was not devoid of political activity.
Magistrates in Ontario are appointed by the Provincial cabinet on
recommendation from the Attorney-General. Hogarth found that
salaries and promotion were dictated by the Attorney-General's
office. The Ministry can exert subtle pressures through denying
or granting, leaves of absence, holiday requests, or conference
budgets.
The magistrates (JPs) appointed to preside often do not 
have formal legal training (see demographic data), therefore they 
often seek legal advice from superiors (Hogarth, 1971). This 
opens channels for potential 'trickle down' influences. The 
legal inexperience of many magistrates at the lower court level 
appears to allow for a greater potential influence on them from 
political interests, as opposed to higher courts. Hogarth's 
study showed that only 28 per cent of magistrates indicated that 
magistrates were as free from influence as higher court judges 
(Hogarth, 1971).
The power of the Attorney-General's office over the JPs in 
Ontario was made evident in the course of this research by the 
author. In initiating contact with the JPs presiding over
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environmental cases, it was believed to be valuable to contact
the Attorney-General7s office for approval- This would allow for
a greater participation rate based on the sanctioning of the
project by the Attorney-General7s office. In a fairly lengthy
telephone conversation with the judge7s office overseeing all
provincial JPs in Ontario, a clear message of hesitancy was
revealed concerning questioning JPs as to their sentencing
philosophy or behaviour. When questioned regarding the
hesitancy, the official candidly responded that:
the office would have to review all questions that 
would be asked, because certain questions could
potentially not be suitable for the JPs to make
statements on, given the public nature of the research.
This clearly shows that the Attorney-General7s office maintains
at least an 'arm7s length7 control over the JPs by intercepting
potentially controversial or complex legal questions.
Hogarth also believed that the magistrates7 relationship to
the "public at large" influenced sentencing. The present
research would support this notion, at least insofar as the
existence of the relationship. The previously stated belief in
"showing the public" as an objective of sentencing, indicates the
sentencing officials cognizance of the public eye. In a recent
study Ouimet and Coyle found that:
The perceived fear of crime (by the public) influenced 
the court practitioner7s sentence recommendation for 
less serious offenses (1991:159).
The ability for public perceptions to be internalized in judicial
functioning is again supported. Regulatory offenses (eg.
environmental) could be classified as legally less serious,
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therefore supporting both Hogarth and the present study.
Actual Disparity in the Present Study
Case #1
Case #1 resulted in a large variance in magnitude of 
sentence. The fines for the corporation ranged from $8000 to 
$200,000. Respondents #3 and #7 were the only ones in agreement, 
levying $10,000 fines. Respondent #3 also made provisions in 
sentence for compensating the down river municipalities. 
Respondent #7 alluded to the same by providing for additional 
cleanup costs. To introduce a 'real life' element to the 
scenario, would be to envision the corporate accused entering two 
separate courts, on one occasion it receives a fine of $8000 and 
the other levies a fine of $200,000. This indicates a severe 
disparity that can only serve to confuse all concerned 
(judiciary, potential violaters, counsel, public, politicians, 
Ministry officials).
Palys and Divorski found that:
Judges who imposed qualitatively different dispositions 
apparently differed also in their perceptions of 
events.
They continued in reference to the two extremes of the range in
one particular case:
Each of these views is quite rational and internally 
consistent. The problem of course is that they both 
refer to the same person and the same offense 
(1984:339).
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Case #2 Fine and Sanction Distributions
Respondent Sanction
1 30 days jail
2 $5,000
3 $100
4 six months jail
5 probation, comm. serv.
6 six months jail
7 $3,000
8 $8,500
9 $3,500 & 60 days jail (intermittent)
10 $2,000 & probation
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Case #2 involving Ronald J. gave rise to more innovative 
sentencing strategies by the respondents. The actual pure fines 
ranged from $8500 to $100. Four officials issued a term of 
incarceration. Three respondents used only the carceral sanction 
(#1, #4, and #6). The terms were 30 days, six months, and six 
months respectively. Respondent #9 levied a $3500 fine in 
addition to 60 days in jail, to be served intermittently.
The disparity is less exaggerated in this case, however it 
could be noted that small differences in sanction severity are 
magnified in application to an individual offender as opposed to 
the corporate entity. The less severe variance in this case 
could be explained by the level of comfort felt by the sentencing 
officials in using the provisional penalties in a case involving 
an individual. The comfort, or general acceptance of the 
penalties for individuals, is expressed in responses to question 
#4.
Case #3
Case #3 elicited the highest level of consensus among 
respondents, although the range was still sufficient to dictate 
concern. Respondent #3 imposed the low sanction, $2000 plus 
cleanup costs. Respondent #10 occupied the upper level by 
somewhat ambiguously imposing "a cash fine near the maximum", 
which in this case could be as high as $400,000. Three 
respondents (#1, #2, and #6) levied fines of $50,000. Agreement
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was found as well between respondents #4, #8, and #9, who all 
imposed $25,000 fines.
The consensus proves interesting, however an explanation is 
elusive. Possibly given the gravity of the offense scenario, the 
offense began to approach a bench mark for the officials, either 
a "worst case" situation, or resembling a previous decision.
Question #4 asked the officials if existing sentencing 
options were adequate to deal with the given case. Respondents 
were asked to list any changes they felt to be necessary if 
options were not adequate.
Case #1 resulted in five respondents stating varying levels 
of dissatisfaction with the existing penalties. The popular 
public response to increase fines found only one supporter in 
respondent #9. This respondent believed that higher fines would 
help deter corporate polluters. Respondent #7 stated that 
corporations were allowed too many "legal loopholes" and that 
legal definitions of corporate actors and entities should be 
refined to reduce this effect. Respondents #1 and #5 expressed a 
need for increasing corporate involvement in the cleanup process. 
Respondents #1 and #4 believed that provisions should be clearer 
to allow financial restitution for affected victims of 
environmental wrongdoing.
Case #2 developed a near consensus in responses to question 
#4. Eight respondents believed that the penalties were adequate 
to deal with individuals. Respondent #1 believed that community 
service should be expressed in the provisions, while respondent
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#2 believed that fine levels should be equated for the OWRA and 
the EPA.
Case #3 offered unanimous approval of existing penalties.
As mentioned previously, the officials apparently held a high 
level of comfort in dealing with this case as exhibited by the 
low level of disparity in sentences surrounding $50,000 and 
$25,000. The fact that all respondents believed that the options 
allowed for an adequate sentence given the case facts, would tend 
to support this assertion.
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XII ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE DATA 
SENTENCING OBJECTIVES
Case #1
In reference to question #2 dealing with sentencing
objectives that would, or should be maximized by the sanction
imposed, the respondents developed two main objectives.
Deterrence, both general and specific, is the most common
principle to strive for in sentencing. It is logical to wish to
deter future crime either from the offending individual or the
community at large. Given the established fine levels imposed by
sentencing officials it is a clear misnomer to assert that a fine
in the amounts levied could be a deterrent. The reliance on the
fine as a mechanism of deterrence stems from the belief that the
corporate (economic) actor is a rational entity, guided by the
rules of profit maximization. The magnitude of the fines imposed
coupled with the established regulatory approach to enforcement
results in an ineffectual tug of war between two methods. This
mistaken faith is illustrated in the statement by Morrow J:
Where the economic rewards are big enough persons or 
corporations will only be encouraged to take what might 
be termed a calculated risk. It seems to me that the 
courts should deal with this type of offence with 
resolution, should stress the deterrent, via the high 
cost, in the hope that the chance will not be taken 
because it is too costly (Swaigen and Bunt, 1985:13).
The belief that the sentencing official (courts) can have a
general deterrent impact is a recurring theme from many
respondents. In response to question #2, respondent #2 stated:
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Our environment is so fragile that a message must be 
sent to offenders and potential offenders that they 
must "clean up their act"; fines of $1000, $2000,and 
$5000 are a thing of the past, insofar as the courts 
are concerned.
To quantify the extent, deterrence was listed by all ten
respondents as a goal of imposing sentence for case #1.
The need for the sentence to "satisfy society" was mentioned
by four respondents. This objective becomes interesting in that
it appears to reflect a degree of non-confidence by the court.
The need to "satisfy the public" is indicative of a need to
legitimate the function of the court. The sentencing officials
are acknowledging the growing public concern regarding
environmental issues, and therefore feel the need to appease this
concern via their judgements. Respondent #4 stated:
Society has to be satisfied that the penalty fits the 
crime.
Respondent #7 continues:
The sentence would be viewed by society that the courts 
will not tolerate such lack of regard for the 
environment, and with the additional costs of clean-up 
levied against the company this should further satisfy 
society that this matter is taken seriously by the 
courts.
Two respondents #7 and #8 indicated the objective of sending 
a message to the judicial system. This indicates that a level of 
internal power is believed to exist by some sentencing officials 
regarding judgements. The fact that no sentencing criteria are 
present, allows the official discretion to impose sentence based 
on a variety of forces (peer, societal, personal, media). The 
desire for a sentence to send an internal message to the judicial
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system introduces a self-regulating mechanism within the
judiciary in reference to a particular offence category,
environmental wrongdoing. Respondent #7 states:
The sentence viewed by the justice system, may be a 
precedent for sentence, but would, indicate to the 
justice system that stiff action must be taken by the 
courts to prevent this type of blatant disregard for 
the environment.
Case #2
In reference to this case, deterrence again was listed as an 
objective of sentence by all respondents. Targeted deterrence 
(specific) was mentioned either directly, or alluded to more 
often in this case. The fact that an individual offender was the 
subject of the scenario could explain this trend. The elusive 
goal of deterrence, via sanction, becomes more attainable when 
the sentencing official is dealing with a more tangible offender, 
and subsequently a more concrete set of facts. Previous 
discussion has illustrated the ability of the corporate entity to 
remain aloof within a barrage of legal and administrative smoke­
screens. Corporate assets, chains of command, and culpability 
are difficult to ascertain for the sentencing official. The 
applicable facts surrounding an individual, however, are often 
quite clear and allow for a targeted, objective driven sanction 
to be imposed. The effects of this are twofold. First, it 
potentially increases the effectiveness of the sentence in 
achieving the prescribed objective. Second, and of greater 
consequence, it allows the individual or small business to become 
a target for judicial legitimation, and increases the likelihood
125
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of prosecution of the 'smaller' offender.
This point is underscored by the inclusion of an element of 
punitiveness in the responses regarding case i2 . Two respondents 
#2 and #6 indicated punishment as part of the sentencing 
objectives. This relates directly to the effectiveness of 
sanctions. It'is logistically less complicated for the 
sentencing official to envision an ability to affect the 
behaviour of an individual, as opposed to a corporation.
A focus that becomes disturbingly conspicuous in its absence 
is a focus on the environment as an element of the occurrence to 
be dealt with by the court. Only two respondents, #2 and #3 
(covering all three cases) mentioned in the objectives, 
"restoration of the environment." Based on comments throughout 
the responses, the court, generally, has a genuine concern for 
the natural environment. However, it would appear it either 
feels it does not posses the tools to affect it, or that it sees 
the natural environment as a responsibility of the Ministry. To 
the detriment of the environment, the court remains myopic in 
that it focuses mainly on the human component.
Case #3
Responses to case #3 elicited the normal pattern of 
deterrence as the primary objective in all respondents, except 
one #3. General deterrence was the most common response, however 
two officials specified that deterrence should be targeted at the 
offender:
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In this case again the major factors roust be 
deterrence, primarily specific deterrence. This 
corporation was aware of problems yet persisted in 
actions which resulted in considerable economic loss to 
the community in addition to environmental damage 
(respondent #9).
The previously mentioned objective of "satisfying the
society at large," surfaces again in three responses,
(#'s 4,7,8). The case scenario was developed to approach a
severe environmental catastrophe, therefore it is logical to
assume that the sentencing official would anticipate a great deal
of societal outrage over the damage. In order to appease this
extensive concern by the public, the sentencing official would
desire to have this objective met through sentence outcome.
The issue of a focus by the sentencing official on not only
the case at hand, but of the community "looking in" is alluded to
by Henham in his 1986 work in Britain. In studying magistrates
as to their opinion on the purpose of sentencing principles,
Henham found that:
57% of those interviewed believed sentencing principles 
are present in order to achieve a just solution in each 
case.
In defining the "just" solution Henham noted that:
Justice in this context referred to what magistrates 
considered to be community justice as well as their own 
opinions (Henham, 1986:190).
This clearly indicates an acknowledgement and/or acceptance of
an amalgamation between the perceived views of society on the
given case and the personal position of the sentencing official.
This would appear to allow for a degree of social justice,
however, when making assumptions on societal views, the
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sentencing officials are opening themselves to misinterpretation, 
as well as dulling the focus from the case facts. Asking an 
individual to ascertain, and therefore reflect the views of the 
greater society, is unattainable and also allows for increased 
disparity between sentencing officials.
Question 3 Characteristics of the offense and
offender having bearing on the decision
Case #1
In Case #1 the most common response to be listed as the 
primary characteristic (listed in the top three), was the extent 
of harm, or magnitude of actual or potential damage. The 
prevalence of this focus is encouraging, in that the officials 
are isolating the environment when developing a view of the 
facts. This contrasts with the lack of focus on the environment, 
per se in the objectives of sentence. Apparently, the officials 
recognize the actual or potential harm to the environment, but do 
not see sentences as being able to affect the after-the-fact 
damage.
The inclusion of the phrase "potential damage", brings about 
the contentious issue of penalizing someone for damage not 
ascertainable at the current time. The majority of environmental 
offenses result in a cumulative effect over time. The damage 
does not occur in total at the time of offense. Therefore, the 
court has a difficult job in imposing fair sanctions that
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represent the harm done. Some sentencing officials are willing
to extend the sentencing objective to potential harm, while
others are not:
In the face of uncertainty, some courts are willing to 
impose substantial sentences, while others hold out for 
proof of substantial risk or harm. The difference, it 
might be suggested lies in the ecological consciousness 
of the judge (Swaigen and Bunt, 1985:17).
Respondent #9 offers insight:
As well the fine should be reflective of the magnitude 
of the damage done. In this case it appears there 
could be significant long-term effects.
If the ecological consciousness of the sentencing official 
directly affects the ability to effectively sentence, based on 
extent of harm, then such consciousness could be raised through 
targeted training for environmental sentencing officials.
The ability of the individual to play such an extensive role 
in determining the sentence, increases the likelihood of 
disparity, and in so doing, creates the likelihood of unfair 
decisions and mixed messages.
The fact that the spill (in case #1) affected the drinking
I
water (for a period of time) of municipalities down river was 
also listed as a main factor in the decision by the respondents.
One respondent #4 mentioned as a factor the effect to the 
fish population. The lack of including this factor in the rest 
of the responses is notable. Two likely explanations are: (1) 
the other sentencing officials failed to retain the facts on the 
fish population from the reading of the case, or (2) the other 
officials did not view the effect on the fish population as a
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determining factor in sentencing. The explanations are equally- 
disturbing. The courts have not been willing to assign any legal 
rights to non-persons (see Emond, 1984).
The anthropocentric attitude by the courts may have been 
successful in delaying dealing with a legally complex issue, 
however it also delays justice from reaching a victim in need in 
many environmental offenses.
In contrast to the non-inclusion of non-human victims in 
sentencing, is the court's continued focus on the characteristics 
of the offender. The fact that the accused corporation had two 
previous convictions under the EPA was listed as a factor guiding 
sentence for all but one respondent. Prior convictions in 
environmental cases are usually treated the same as in 
traditional criminal hearings (Swaigen and Bunt, 1985). The near 
unanimous inclusion of prior convictions is understandable based 
on the clear delineation in the penalty sections of the Acts, 
between first and subsequent offense categories.
Theoretically, one would expect a concern to surface 
regarding the economic conditions of the offending corporation. 
The governmental, public relations balancing act between economic 
growth and environmental protection, undoubtedly manifests itself 
in the state's periphery institutions (justice system). Given 
the fact that the sentencing officials have expressed a clear 
connection with a societal image, a concern over threatening jobs 
via a large fine would be expected. Four respondents listed si2e 
of the corporation as a factor directing sentence:
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... How the amount of fine might affect the employees 
at the plant. Sometimes high fines force closure of 
plants or affects the subsequent salary negotiations 
(respondent 4).
However, one must also look at the size of the
corporation. The fine imposed must not create a
greater harm than it seeks to redress. If the fine is 
of such a magnitude that the corporation loses its 
viability as a business, there may be a resultant loss 
of jobs which could in itself create an economic and 
social harm to the public (respondent 9).
The court in g. v. The Canada Metal Co. Ltd. stated a
position in reference to corporate size, and ability to pay:
In public welfare offenses, the protection of the 
public is paramount to individual interests. The 
ultimate balancing of environmental damage against the 
economic benefit of commercial enterprise involves 
policy choices that are within the purview of the 
legislation (in Swaigen and Bunt, 1985:26).
The courts, therefore, clearly acknowledge the dilemma, and based
on responses and sentences, clearly opt in most cases, for the
politically safe route.
Case /2
Case #2 involving the hypothetical accused individual Ronald 
J. presented a clearly different array of potential mitigating or 
guiding factors. Responses to question #3 after this case 
resulted in the greatest disparity among officials.
The most often cited factor (although at varying levels of 
importance), was the extent or severity of the damage. In all,
17 different factors were listed by the respondents as important 
in directing sentence. In order to underscore the variance one 
can turn to the first listed factor of the respondents.
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The marital status of Ronald J. as being single was listed
by one respondent. This could indicate a decision to proceed
with a harsher penalty, based on the individual's lack of spouse
or family that could potentially be burdened emotionally or
financially from a given sanction.
Remorse was stated as a primary factor, and was listed by
other respondents, albeit as less influential:
As in street crimes and trade cases, remorse or 
contrition has been recognized as a mitigating factor 
in environmental cases (Swaigen and Bunt, 1985:29).
The case scenario indicated that children played in the area
and discovered the drums of waste. One respondent, #4, listed the
danger to children as a primary factor. It is notable that this
same respondent listed only factors external to the individual as
directing sentence— danger to children, danger to farm animals,
damage to water table, and the fact that Ronald J. was
trespassing to commit the offense.
One respondent, #5, listed the character of Ronald J. as
primary, therefore his previous record and personal status
(employment, marital) were retained as most directing in choosing
the appropriate sanction.
Two respondents, #3 and #7, clearly held a different view of
the case based on the presented facts. The variance again
underscores the disparity between sentencing officials. These
two respondents chose to focus on the role of the small
manufacturing company for which Ronald J. had disposed of the
waste, and the municipality (the land owner). Respondent #7
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stated that the manufacturing company should have had a
certificate from the Ministry to both possess, and dispose of
such materials:
They would have been aware of their responsibility even 
though they are a small enterprise.
The same respondent listed as a factor:
The accused Ronald J. - his drive to survive in 
economic hard times.
This is a clear transition from other respondents' perspectives.
Respondent (3) believed that the municipality was partially
responsible due to its "sloppy business" of a verbal contract
with farmers, and the absence of fencing surrounding the quarry
area. This focus away from the accused is clearly indicated in
the sentence imposed by respondent (3).
Other factors that were listed are the fact that Ronald J.
did not report the spill, the choice of a "public" site by the
accused to dispose of waste, negligence by the accused, and on a
number of occasions, the financial situation of Ronald J.:
The magnitude of the fine levied on an individual 
person must bear some reasonable relationship to his 
ability to pay. This presents a problem in the case of 
the offender who has little means but has committed a 
very serious offense (Swaigen and Bunt, 1985:25).
Case #3
Case #3 involving the family-owned corporate accused Rondel 
Manufacturing gave witness to the listing of the magnitude or 
severity of offense, as one of the major factors directing 
sentence in most instances. Substantial variance still existed
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as to the relevance of other factors.
The conscious violation of the Ministry control order by the 
company in order to meet production was listed by five 
respondents. This would tend to express a belief by the court 
that the interaction of industry and Ministry is a viable 
mechanism for environmental protection that deserves upholding in 
sentencing behaviour.
The inclusion of a dossier of 'corporate character' and 
financial hardship by the corporation in the scenario was used to 
present the respondent with a difficult choice between 
environmental protection and economic viability. Seven 
respondents listed the '’corporate character” , or economic 
conditions of the company as influential. Three respondents 
listed such factors as primary in influencing sentence choice.
The choice that the sentencing official is faced with is 
becoming increasingly difficult, as manufacturing jobs are being 
lost for a variety of reasons (changing world economy, free 
trade). It becomes a politically dangerous adventure to drop the 
'heavy hand of the law' as a matter of precedent when economic 
considerations are at stake in a community. Elected officials 
(MPP, MP) do not want their constituencies facing economic 
decline at the gain of environmental legal precedent. The 
message is undoubtedly carried through the political channels 
(directly or indirectly) to the sentencing officials. The 
impetus therefore remains inaction, despite the expressed 
tendency of some sentencing officials, (based on responses in the
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current study) to "send a message to the judiciary."
This is not a plea for using the legal sanction as a
bulletin for environmental awareness at the expense of economic
quality of life via employment. The facts serve, however, to
illuminate an intertwined group of competing goals manifested
through incompatible means. The goal of environmental protection
is quite clear, what is obscured is the route and medium this
goal should be articulated within. The wide disparity in
sentence and the variance among directing factors of identical
cases reflects a deficiency for the current format of the justice
system to attain the aforementioned goal.
In response to question #3 one respondent #3 focused
entirely on Rondel's situation. The factors that were listed
were; (1) Rondel is not able to withstand undue financial
hardship, (2) The plant is family owned, (3) The municipality is
small, (4) 35 workers were recently laid off.
The focus is interesting in light of a point of law brought
up by Swaigen and Bunt:
There is no rule of law that a corporation that is 
undercapitalized to meet its obligations, be they 
contractual, tortious, or criminal, is entitled to 
salvation from the consequences of its own acts 
(1985:26).
Again to underscore the disparity among officials, respondent 
(9) states:
Although some consideration should be given to the 
continuing economic viability of the corporation, in a 
situation such as this the court and the community at 
large should not have the welfare of the community held 
ransom to such economic considerations and a clear 
message must be given through the penalty that such
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behaviour cannot be tolerated.
In reference to the public's views on environmental
protection versus economic considerations, a March 1991 poll by
Winnipeg based Angus Reid found the following. More than 75 per
cent of the people surveyed said:
The government should not reduce its focus on 
environmental protection, even if it means a slower 
recovery from the recession.
and:
Canadians don't want the government to ease up on 
pollution regulations even if it would put more people 
back to work (Vancouver Sun, April 2 1991:A1).
These statements reflect a level of success by the
government's legitimation apparatus to instill a belief in the
public of a "focus on environmental protection" and that they
have "tough" legislation. The political patronage slush fund
known as the Federal Green Plan has accomplished some of the
success, given its extensive budget for advertising. The alluded
to belief in "tough legislation" merely reinforces the
"implementation gap" (Webb, 1988), the great rift between
available sentencing limits and actual sentences.
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XIII DEMOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF RESPONDENTS
The demographic questions in the questionnaire allow for a 
picture to be created of the respondent's experience and 
geographic situation.
The ten respondents represent a microcosm of the actual 
population of sentencing officials dealing with environmental 
cases. The majority of cases are heard before a presiding 
Justice of the Peace, therefore the current sample contains eight 
JPs . The court structure allows for cases to be appealed or sent 
directly to a court of higher standing where a judge would hear 
the case. The current study contains two judges.
The experience presiding over legal cases, based on years 
presiding, ranges from four to 25 years; the mean being 12.8 
years.
The respondents maintain a group environmental/legal 
experience level, (based on total environmental cases presided 
over) of 401 total cases. However, two respondents answered 
vaguely (very few, and numerous). The range for environmental 
cases heard was five to 200.
The academic profile of the respondents can be divided on 
title. The two judges both possess B.A.s and LL.B.s, one judge 
also possesses an MA degree. The JPs' educational training 
ranges from grade eight (for the most experienced in years) to a 
B.A. and an LL.B. for the JP with the least years presiding.
Three of the remaining six have acquired bachelor degrees. The
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remaining three stated completion of Ministry training seminars, 
and some college courses, as the highest academic level attained 
An interesting academic qualification absent from any of the 
respondents records, and also, apparently from Governmental 
policy on hiring, is the presence of a biological or ecological 
focus of study. The sentencing official with such academic 
training would clearly have the ability to discern the 
connections between environmental wrongdoing and environmental 
impact.
All of the respondents sit in Provincial court, either 
Provincial Offenses or Provincial Court General Division.
The respondents were asked to indicate the size of the 
geographic area which they serve. The sentencing official may 
travel to various courts or municipalities to preside over cases 
The inclusion of this variable was based on the belief that this 
would indicate if an adequate rural/urban representation was 
achieved in the sample. The primacy of personal judicial 
attitudes to the sanction imposed (Hogarth, 1971; Lovegrove, 
1984; Palys and Divorski, 1986), would indicate that over­
representation of urban or rural could influence the validity of 
the study. The respondents represented all categories, ranging 
from populations of less than 5,000 to 250,000 +.
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"The Worst Case"
Question #6 in the questionnaire pertains to the worst case
scenario that becomes an unofficial internalized judicial bench
mark for sentencing. Swaigen and Bunt discuss the "worst case":
In environmental, as in criminal cases, the maximum 
fine is to be reserved for the worst possible cases.
The factors that move a situation towards the worst 
case include, surreptitiousness, deliberateness, 
recklessness, attitude, and disregard for instructions 
of environmental authorities (1985:24).
The sentencing officials in the present study echoed many of 
these factors. The case scenarios were developed with the hope 
that the case facts would approach a potential "worst case" 
without sacrificing authenticity. In responding to sentence as 
well as to question #6, only two respondents mentioned the "worst 
case" belief. Respondent #7 stated in question #6 that cases #1 
and #3 approached the "worst case." Respondent #10 in 
sentencing case #3 stated that the sentence should be a "cash 
fine near the maximum," therefore alluding to the "worst case" 
bench mark.
The above statements serve to increase the disparity levels 
of sentences between officials. The fine distributions for each 
case, #1 or #3, clearly show that the "worst case" was far from 
some sentencing officials' minds when imposing the sanction. The 
disparity, in turn, shows the personal, subjective nature of a
judicial tool such as the "worst case."
The most common qualities of the hypothetical "worst case"
stated by the respondents were somewhat predictable. The extent
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of damage, duration of offense, amount or type of pollutant, and 
potential for long term effects, all speak to the nature of the 
act. Previous convictions, or "the repeat offender" was also a 
factor in the respondents' "worst case." Two respondents made 
direct statements on the effects to "human" populations. No 
respondents mentioned implicitly the damage to or concern for 
wildlife. Financial circumstances were mentioned as factors of 
the "worst case" on two occasions. The cost of cleanup was 
stated by respondent #1, while the economic circumstances of the 
defendant were mentioned by respondent #2.
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The Working of the Environmental Legal Machine 
Questions 7 to 11
Questions #7 to #11 in the questionnaire attempt to 
ascertain the actual functioning of specific pieces of 
environmental legislation.
Section 146 (d)(2) of the EPA allows for the addition of 
"other conditions" to be included in the sentence..."that the 
court considers appropriate to prevent similar unlawful conduct 
or to contribute to rehabilitation." Question #7 asked the 
officials if they had ever invoked this section. Eight of the 
respondents answered "no" to this question, however one of the 
eight stated that a prosecutor had on one occasion asked for a 
condition under that section. One respondent was unaware of the 
section, however a condition to "restore land to the satisfaction 
of the Ministry" was issued by the individual. Respondent (3) 
affirmed the use of the section on one occasion. The condition 
was to remove fill that was dumped illegally. The use of the 
clause for such a condition would not appear to be conducive to 
"prevent similar conduct," or "contribute to rehabilitation."
The section 146 (d)(2) can be seen as an opportunity for 
innovative or creative sentencing by the official. The responses 
by the sample would indicate that the section is only serving to 
increase distance for the "implementation gap" phenomena, and not 
as an innovative sentencing tool.
The responses to question #4 would indicate that some
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sentencing officials desire an opportunity to use more effective
sentencing measures for some cases. The lack of use for s.146
(d)(2) would therefore indicate that the sentencing official
wants the sentencing option clearly spelled out in the
provisional penalties. The non-use of s. 146 (d)(2) coupled with
the expressed desire for other sentences indicates a reluctance
to initiate or "step out from the crowd" in reference to
sentencing. The use of 146 (d) would require substantial legal
self confidence, insofar as its use would generate interest by
the legal community.
Questions #8 and #9 refer to the EPA section 145a:
The counsel or agent acting on behalf of the Crown, by 
notice to the clerk of the Provincial Offenses Court 
may require that a Provincial judge preside over a 
proceeding in respect of an offense under this Act 
(R.S.O. 1980 c.141 s.145(a)).
Equivalent sections exist in the other pertinent Acts as 
well. The proportion of cases being moved on to a higher court 
as witnessed by the respondents is quite small (ranging from none 
to 25 per cent). Three respondents indicated that none had been 
moved on, while one respondent stated the figure was unknown.
The small numbers of cases that are moved on at request could be 
explained by the functioning of a legal relationship.
Prosecutors and defense counsel may feel that they command more 
power in a court presided over by a JP as opposed to a judge.
The perceived or actual ability of counsel to influence both 
disposition and sentence may be maximized under such a 
relationship. The lack of professional legal training by many
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presiding JPs (only one JP possessed an LL.B. in the present 
study), could create a knowledge differential that could favour 
counsel.
Question #9 refers to the subsequent appeal of a decision, 
after being issued by the sentencing official. Appeals were also 
quite limited, as expressed by the respondents (ranging from none 
to 25 per cent). Four respondents stated that none of the 
environmental cases they presided over had been appealed. The 
mean figure pivots around 5 per cent.
Question #10 asked the sentencing officials to state the 
most common defenses used in environmental cases, based on their 
experiences. This question was answered by nine respondents. 
Seven officials stated, "due diligence" as the major defense 
used. The chapter on defenses deals with the implications of the 
due diligence as it was created via the Sault Ste. Marie 
decision. The defense is popular in that it does not require 
proof that the offense was not committed. The defense allows for 
presentation of mechanisms that show diligence in preventing 
pollution occurrences. As mentioned earlier, the defense is 
based on the wide concept of 'reasonableness', which in turn is 
determined with reference to the practices of the industry, not 
the costs to the environment. The mechanism can be carefully 
implemented by an astute company, to be low cost, ineffectual 
instruments or policies that can be legally impressive should a 
prosecution be initiated.
The popularity of the due diligence defense (as expressed
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by the respondents), supports previously stated literature, 
(Jeffrey, 1984; Wilson, 1986) regarding the implications of the 
defense in reference to the extent of use. The present study 
serves to link literature with actual occurrence in that regard.
Defenses other than due diligence mentioned by the 
respondents were as follows; (1) Mthe event was due to an 
unforseen occurrence." This could be likened to the "Act of God" 
defense previously mentioned. (2) "The economic costs associated 
with better monitoring were excessive." The existence of such a 
defense is testimony to the weight given economic survival and 
economic growth by the justice system. (3) "Ignorance in the 
law" as a defense was cited by one respondent. (4) The plea that 
the discharge or activity did not result in environmental damage 
was used as a defense in cases heard by one respondent.
Question #11 asked the sentencing official to provide 
comments on changes to any area of environmental law that the 
individual deemed necessary. The question was included in the 
hopes of a response, however it is clearly stated to officials of 
the court (therefore government) not to make comment (either pro 
or con) regarding legislation, or public policy (based on 
conversation with the Attorney-General's office). Four 
respondents took advantage of the question to express concerns.
Respondent #8 stated:
more training in dealing with environmental matters is
extremely important.
Respondent #5 stated:
eliminate imprisonment as a penalty in most
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environmental cases so that charter (of rights) 
problems raised in R̂ . v. Ellis Don, and 1L. v. Wholesale 
Travel do not arise.
This concern refers to the reversal of proof in strict 
liability cases as created by the Sault Ste Marie case. The fact 
that the burden is placed on the defendant to prove, on a balance 
of probabilities the defense of due diligence, has been 
challenged as contravening s.7 of the Charter, therefore forcing 
the defendant to prove innocence.
Respondent #2 stated:
I would like to see more uniformity in sentencing; 
consistent, periodic review of environmental 
legislation; perhaps environmental training sessions; 
severe sentencing provisions for the worst offenders.
The admission of highly disparate sentences is a candid response
by the official and gives credence to the established figures of
the current research. The request for training is also
significant in respect to a need for recognizing a uniqueness to
the functioning and objectives of environmental legislation.
Respondent #1 stated:
Municipalities, because of impersonal connections are 
not forced to comply and are not penalized to the 
extent of individuals. They should set the example but 
in most cases because of inadequate funds are allowed 
to discharge into watercourses, untreated material on a 
regular basis.
The situation surrounding municipalities or any level of state 
administration (federally, see Saxe, 1990) is of considerable 
importance to environmental protection. The state administration 
becomes an incompatible product for the justice system. The 
mechanisms in place to deal with environmental wrongdoing are
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clearly inconsistent for dealing with state bodies (Municipal, 
Provincial, Federal). Given the goals of sentencing, the court 
can clearly not affect the behaviour of such an entity via a 
traditional sanction. The state entity becomes more elusive to 
delineate than a private corporate actor. Therefore, public 
corporations remain essentially insulated from scrutiny of 
environmental practices given their connections to state power 
and influence.
Three respondents answering question #11 stated that no 
changes were required. The remaining three officials declined 
comment either explicitly or through absence of response.
147
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
XIV POST STRUCTURALIST DISCUSSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Claus Offe, in his post structuralist analysis of political 
economic arrangements, offers an interesting model for the 
analysis of the presented material. To set the stage, Offe is 
paraphrased as establishing the following set of conditions.
The state is faced (in post modern society) with the dilemma 
of maintaining forces supportive of capital accumulation and 
commodification, as well as maintaining "mass loyalty" or 
"diffuse support" of the voting public. The market system is 
constantly producing "by products" that are counterproductive of 
its development. The state must intervene and rectify the 
problem, at least in the short term. The dilemma lies in the 
compensatory intervention of the state. The regulatory behaviour 
of the state increases societal expectations over time, until the 
intervention of the state reaches a critical level in terms of 
maintaining the forces of capital accumulation. The operative 
concepts therefore become state intervention through welfare 
state and regulatory services, market functioning, and societal 
expectations:
The minimum level of intervention is defined by the 
inventory of problems produced by the economic system.
These problems potentially endanger its existence, but 
cannot be processed and solved by this economic system 
(Offe, 1984:54).
The "problems" created are analogous to pollution. Pollution is 
created by the functioning of the economic system. The "problem"
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cannot be "processed" or "solved" by the economic system because
it is economically inefficient to spend capital on abatement
technology, as abatement costs cannot increase profit margins
directly. Offe continues:
At the same time, a maximum level exists, beyond this 
point regulatory services and initiatives cease to 
compensate for the defects of the market-regulated 
process of creating surplus value, by in fact over 
compensating and thereby challenging the identity of 
the system. Beyond this maximum point interventions 
stimulate interpretations of needs which are both 
antagonistic to the system and which potentially 
subject the exchange system not merely to subsidiary 
political control, but actual political control 
(1984:54).
The maximum level in the case of environmental protection 
can be established as the point at which enforcement and 
prosecution would correct environmental wrongdoing. In analyzing 
judicial and Ministerial behaviour surrounding the issue of 
environmental protection, one can observe the ineffectual nature 
of the behaviour. It becomes easy to blindly suggest that, "huge 
fines would stop that company from polluting" (by shutting it 
down). Ideological statements are uttered with ease, however, 
the political implementation of such is extremely difficult.
Increasing state intervention via the current process would 
surely "challenge the identity of the system." Given the primacy 
of the economic system, one can therefore not expect increased 
intervention by the state, and subsequently should not expect 
increased environmental protection or solutions. Advancement in 
these areas will only result if industry and big business 
sanction the course of events or methods. The gains for the
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environment are therefore at a pace dictated by the forces of 
capital accumulation, not at the pace necessary for arresting 
environmental degradation.
The statement by Offe that "beyond this point intervention 
stimulates interpretations of needs...", is clearly analogous to 
public perception regarding environmental issues. The increase 
in societal consciousness, and the green movements, can be 
rooted, theoretically to the "problems produced by the economic 
system" (pollution, environmental degradation). Worldwide people 
are witnessing the dysfunctional nature of capital in reference 
to natural preservation. The force of the awareness is 
exacerbated by the need for state regulatory intervention. The 
haphazard intervention by the state in terms of regulating 
industrial activity further stimulates a growing public concern. 
The growth is exponential and can only pose the most unenviable 
dilemma for the moderating agency, the state.
In reference to Offe's maximum and minimum levels of 
theoretical state intervention, in the current issue the two 
points can be seen as coexistent. That being, a move in either 
direction (under current practices) is severely detrimental for 
the state's "diffuse support." Offe mentions the possibility (of 
coexistence) on a theoretical level, however, he does not expand 
it:
According to this hypothesis, there would have to be a 
point X at which the minimum and maximum thresholds 
intersect. This point would have to be interpreted as 
one at which the interventions necessary for the 
material reproduction of capitalist society are, at the 
same time, the kind which stimulate the interpretations
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of needs which negate the capitalist form of social 
reproduction as such (1984:59).
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XV SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS
The current research progressed through a series of stages, 
each offering its own insight into the tri-lateral relationship 
between legislation, the behavior of sentencing officials, and 
sentence.
The review of the relevant Acts allowed for the initial 
variable in the "implementation gap" to be explored. The 
legislation, while being a legitimate attempt, is known to be 
incomplete, and therefore becomes a creation of Provincial 
governmental theatrics, that is, merely the by-product of a self- 
legitimating process. The legislation, when analyzed 'in and of 
itself7 offers promising proposals and a tool for effecting 
environmental protection. The provisional penalties conveniently 
spell out sentencing ranges and options to satisfy the most 
obvious objectives. Legislation is tabled in the House and is 
debated, the media reports the amendments, and the final document 
is published for all interested parties to possess. The 
legislation is a prop in a public process of societal 
appeasement, an attempt at managing the "crisis of crisis 
management" (Offe 1984). The element that is not publicly 
scrutinized and reported by the media is the functioning and 
performance of the given legislation. The rift in this reporting 
becomes the "raison d'etre" of the thesis, to fill this gap in 
our sociological knowledge.
The governing party exerts its power at the performance 
level, constraining activity by its peripheral arms (MOE ) via
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budget allocations, The allocation of funds is, in effect, the 
puppet strings that dictate what can be accomplished from within 
the given Acts. However, the public only hears that maximum 
penalties were raised, not if they were ever invoked.
The legal case material was offered so that a light of 
tangible realism could be shed on otherwise theoretically obtuse 
concepts. The defenses employed by the accused allow one to see 
the legally available mitigating circumstances that inevitably 
are a statement of the quality of the legislation.
The Sault Sto Marie case was explored in depth in order to 
illustrate the post facto implications of a landmark Canadian 
legal case. The discussion was a preamble for the legal 
exploration of criminal versus regulatory foci in prosecuting 
environmental wrongdoers. The dilemma between the two foci 
illustrates the need for grounding heartfelt public statements 
(get tough, criminalize), with the legal reality of the current 
situation. Public opinion is often not amenable to logic, and it 
is a credit to its often illogical nature, that the assembled 
power of the populace can exert such a force on the state (as 
witnessed by the growing concern in the masses and the 
acknowledgement of the concern by Parliament and Provincial 
Legislatures).
The 1989 prosecution data offered the second variable in the 
"implementation gap" concept. The data offered actual evidence 
of prosecution and sentencing behaviour. The variance between 
actuairsentence levels and available options is extensive. The
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lack of numerous, large, well known corporate citizens can 
presumably further the assumption that large corporations are 
exerting influence on the peripheral institutions of the state 
and therefore creating non-traditional options for dealing with 
their environmental 'problems.' The absence could also suggest 
that given budgetary constraints, prosecution of large legally 
powerful corporations is not consistently initiated. The 
presence of either option gives rise to a power differential in 
favour of the economic interests of major capital accumulators.
"The implementation gap" is extended in that an expressed 
objective of deterrence is inconsistent with fines or sanctions 
levied. The ineffectual nature of deterrence was discussed 
theoretically and empirically given the available data of the 
present research.
The data received from the sentencing officials offered an 
insightful view of controlled sentencing behaviour. The 
disparity exhibited is an expression of personal autonomy and 
control, but also of system confusion. The fines levied at the 
low end by the sentencing officials, concur with the 1989 data in 
reference to the variance from available options. This variance, 
as well as consistent comments and objectives surrounding 
economic conditions of defendants, shows an unwillingness to 
'hurt' corporations via the sanction. The legal obligation to 
consider such conditions is not present in any Act, therefore the 
response to economic conditions is not a judicial response per 
se, but a political one. The link further solidifies the often
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unconscious relationship between political-economic policy and
the judiciary- The expressed interest in economic considerations
is natural and expected in a highly individualized, essentially
unstructured sentencing process. One judge expressed concern
over the disparity in saying:
I think it is impossible to reach anything that is 
going to be what other judges would reach. I think it 
is, unfortunately, a matter somewhat of guesswork 
(Webb, 1988:43).
The focus is necessary for a public official (given 
political repercussions to the contrary), however the focus is 
counterproductive to environmental protection. The problem may 
be rooted in the lack of accountability, and the faceless nature 
of the judiciary.
The focus cannot be removed from the judicial forum, 
therefore the goal of environmental protection would dictate 
changing the forum. The expressed goals of sentencing as stated 
by the respondents were not supported theoretically or 
empirically by the imposed sentences. This corresponds tc the 
1989 datn as well.
The data presented leads one to the conclusion that the 
judicial arena is an ineffective forum for dealing with multi­
faceted issues surrounding environmental wrongdoing.
Environmental issues embody all that is complex within present 
social, economic, and political issues. The complex issue is not 
mathematical. It cannot be reduced or dismantled to its parts.
In a post-modern world of social and economic transformations, a 
struggle has developed between short term quality of life and
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development, and a sustainable technological morality. In 
removing the task of environmental protection from the shrouded 
mystique of the halls of justice, it undoubtedly must relocate to 
a more visible socio/political arena where the outcomes may be 
more beneficial, but the implementation considerably more 
intellectually taxing.
The one element that can lead the change is establishing the 
operative goal and allowing this goal to dictate the strategy.
The goal can only be environmental protection and sustainability 
of the natural sphere, given the alternative as being economic 
unsustainability, social disunity, and losr: of life (all animal 
life). The fact that the issue cannot be reduced dictates a 
change in general attitude.
Economic considerations are a valid concern; however, they
must be incorporated within the strategy, not remain a mitigating
circumstance. Isolating either environmental quality or economic
development is an archaic and dangerous path. A recent statement
by the Canadian Economic Development Ambassador to the USA
regarding the proposed tri-lateral free trade deal in North
America, indicates the separation of the essential elements is
still prevalent;
Environmental concerns should not become a 
barrier to trade negotiations (CBC National 
News, April 7th 1991).
It is not a productive stance for the public to view the 
issue as one in which "government should get tougher with 
polluters." Cooperation of all elements of society is essential.
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The presence of concern surrounding the economic implications of 
environmental protection is understandable and desirable given 
the current political economic structure of the world. Therefore 
it is self-defeating to stand aside and support widespread 
closure of industry as a means of "getting tough" and combatting 
pollution. The answer is translating the projected public 
concern into financial support via public tax dollars, thus 
removing the dominant ideology that government is responsible.
The urgency of the timeframe does not allow for a fair, equitable 
distribution of the responsibility of environmental degradation. 
The response by critics is obvious, "the public did not cause the 
problem, industry is the offender, make them pay." The position, 
while being partly correct, is both theoretically flawed and 
environmentally disastrous. General society made up a 
functioning unit within the advancing capitalist formation, 
whether by choice or necessity is not the issue. All occupants 
of the ecological heartland have played a negligent role in 
expanding environmental degradation, and therefore must become an 
integral component of the solution. If one waits for market 
forces to invoke positive environmental action (corrective 
measures, abatement), the dilemma will develop exponentially to 
include more irreparable areas.
The state of the natural environment can no longer be a 
flowery platform for politicians or ecologists. The reality is, 
it must become an institutionalized welfare concern no less 
important than health or economic development, because, as stated
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previously, the state of the environment embodies both issues.
The current work has provided a picture of current thought 
surrounding environmental-legal action. The use of all levels of 
contributing jurisdictions and players allows one to witness 
clearly the gaps that exist between all concerned and/or involved 
parties. Environmental protection can never advance past infancy 
until the changing industrial political world embraces it for 
more than an innovative marketing strategy.
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CASE #1
On April 15, 1990, at the Industrial Chemical Division 
of Chemotec Inc., a discharge of a chemical byproduct was 
reported. The discharge continued over a 30-hour period 
into the adjacent river, via a drainage pipe.
The amount of the chemical discharged (approximately
50,000 litres) is in sufficient amounts to cause a 
potentially serious threat to spawning fish populations in 
the adjacent river (based on Ministry of the Environment 
tests). At the time of discharge, the fish spawning season 
was at its peak. The Ministry was informed of the discharge 
subsequent to its detection by plant workers. (The 
duration of the discharged period was ascertained reliably, 
based on the rate of flow of the contaminant and the volume 
lost in the holding tanks.)
Chemotec was found guilty of contravening the Water 
Resources Act 16 (1).
INFORMATION
* Chemotec pleaded guilty to the charge.
* The plant employs 250 workers.
* Three municipalities down river from Chemotec take their 
water supplies from the said river. ;As. a result of the 
spill, they had to suspend intake fcr 5,\3 and 3 days, 
respectively while monitoring took place.\
* Chemotec was convicted of two previous offenses under the 
EPA Section 13 (1).
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With regard to the case you have just reviewed:
1. What sentence would you assign?
2. What objectives do you see the sentence(s) assigned 
as fulfilling, with regard to the offender, society, and our 
justice system?
(e.g. deterrence, rehabilitation, restitution, etc.)
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3. Please list in the order of their importance, those
facts regarding the offender and/or cffeuce which had the
greatest bearing on your decisions.
4. Do you feel the existing sentencing options, or 
ranges therein, are adequate to deal with this case?
If not, what changes would you suggest, and in what
area?
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CASE #2
On July 17, 1990 the accused Ronald J. entered into a 
verbal agreement with a small local manufacturing plant to 
dispose of twenty, 45-gallon metal drums of a known, highly 
toxic substance, in addition to four drums (of the same 
size) of a moderately radioactive arsenic-based waste soil. 
The-accused transported the drums to a small abandoned 
quarry (30 ft. deep, approx. 200 ft. dia.). The quarry was 
located on municipal rural land, 1.5 kilometres off a county 
road. The closest dwelling is .75 kilometres frcm the site. 
The quarry currently is approx. two-thirds full of rain 
water. A geological survey concluded that the porous 
limestone base of the quarry has undoubtedly allowed for an 
undiscernible level of leaching of the contaminants into 
adjacent agricultural lands.
The quarry was being used as a watering area for the 
adjacent farm's cattle, under permission from the 
municipality,
Ronald J. was found guilty of contravening Section 13 
(1) of the EPA.
INFORMATION
* The accused pleaded not guilty.
* Age 28
* Occupation - seasonally employed carpenter and transporter
* Marital status - single.
* Previous convictions - assault (1984), impaired driving 
(1986), no previous environmental offenses.
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CASE #2 ...cont'd
* The Prosecution, prior to plea by the accused, informed 
the Defense that a penalty would he sought under 147 (l)c 
and 147 (3) of the EPA.
* Ronald J. has exhibited remorse for his actions in 
conversations with the Crown. He cited severe economic 
conditions and unemployment as reasons for his actions.
* Ronald J. was charged based on knowledge obtained via an 
investigation by the Ministry of the Environment after the 
waste drums were found (many broken and drained into the 
quarry) by local children. The discovery was reported by 
the children's parents.
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With regard to the case you have just reviewed:
1. What sentence would you assign?
2. What objectives do you see the sentence(s) assigned 
as fulfilling, with regard to the offender, society, and our 
justice system?
(e.g. deterrence, rehabilitation, restitution, etc.)
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3. Please list in the order of their importance, those
facts regarding the offender and/or offence which had the
greatest bearing on your decisions.
4. Do you feel the existing sentencing options, or 
ranges therein, are adequate to deal with this case?
If not, what changes would you suggest, and in what
area?
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CASE #3
Rondel Manufacturing is a family-owned plant 
specializing in the production and distribution of rubber 
sealants. The business has only one location situated in a 
town of 1700 people. Rondel is the only significant 
industry in the town and employs 36% of the employed labour 
force.
Rondel had recently laid off 35 workers, citing lack of 
contracts as the reason. A request was made by a client to 
have an order filled three days sooner than previously 
agreed upon. In order to meet the deadline, a secondary 
mixing tank was put into operation by the plant foreman.
The secondary mixing facility was under a stop order by the 
Ministry of the Environment pending installation of 
contingency safeguards.
During operation of the secondary tank, a spill of the 
mixing broth (10,000 litres of concentrated corrosive 
compound) resulted. The contaminant entered the town sewage 
system via large floor drains around the secondary mixer.
The sudden overload to the town system caused backups 
into storm drains, and amounts of the mixture ran down a 
residential street drainage ditch. An overflow at the town
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CASE #3 ...cont'd
filtration plant, resulting from the excess flow, caused 
overflow from sewage lagoons onto surrounding land and into 
an adjacent forest.
The chemical can cause serious respiratory damage when 
inhaled. However, it does not mix well with water and 
therefore extensive cleanup of the town drainage system is 
required and is currently under way, under the direction of 
the Ministry of the Environment. Fifteen residential 
dwellings have been evacuated pending cleanup.
Rondel was found guilty of contravening section 13 (1) 
of the EPA.
INFORMATION
* Rondel pleaded guilty to the charges.
* Rondel has applied for federal and provincial aid to 
upgrade facilities and to continue operations.
* Management cites : economic costs as the reasons for non- 
compliance with the previous control order issued by the 
Ministry.
* Rondel is active in local service organizations, 
government, and sports groups.
* Rondel was convicted previously (1986) with imrioper 
storage of chemicals, contravening the EPA.
* The Ministry was notified of the spill by the town 
Council, not Rondel.
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With regard to the case you have just reviewed:
1. What sentence would you assign?
2. What objectives do you see the sentence(s) assigned 
as fulfilling, with regard to the offender, society, and our 
justice system?
(e.g. deterrence, rehabilitation, restitution, etc.)
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3. Please list in the order of their importance, those
facts regarding the offender and/or offence which had the
greatest bearing on your decisions.
4. Do you feel the existing sentencing options, or 
ranges therein, are adequate to deal with this case?
If not, what changes would you suggest, and in what
area?
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1. How many years have you been presiding over legal cases?
2. In that period, approximately how many cases have been 
of an environmental nature?
3. What is the level of academic training you have 
received? (e.g. college or university courses, BA, I-LB, 
LLM, etc.)
4. In what level of court do you currently sit?
5. Please indicate the size of community you serve. If you 
visit several communities on circuit, please indicate the 
sizes of the communities you visit by placing one check mark 
opposite the appropriate population category for each 
community served.
250.000 +_________________ ____________
100.000 - 250,000________ ____________
50.000 - 100,000 ____________
25.000 - 50,000 ____________
10.000 - 25,000 ____________
5,000 - 10,000 ____________
under 5,000 ____________
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6. It is general legal understanding that the maximum 
limits of the sentencing range are reserved for the "worst 
case." What elements would have to be present in your 
conception of a hypothetical environmental "worst 
case"?
7. Section 146d. (2) of the EPA allows for the addition of 
"other conditions" to be included in the sentence..."that 
the court considers appropriate to prevent similar unlawful 
conduct or to contribute to rehabilitation."
Have you ever invoked this clause in a sentence? If so, how 
often, and what would an example be of an "other condition" 
under this Section?
8. To your knowledge, approximately what percentage of 
environmental cases that come before you are moved on to 
another level of court, either at the request of Counsel, or 
your request?
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9. To your knowledge, what percentage of cases you sentence 
are appealed to a higher court?
10. Based on your experience, what are the most common 
defenses used in environmental cases?
11. Are there any changes that you could suggest be made to 
any area of environmental law (legislatively, 
administratively, sentences, information, training, etc.) 
that would benefit the system as a whole, or make your tasks 
more effective or efficient?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
V I T A  AUCTORIS
NAME:
PLACE OF BIRTH: 
YEAR OF BIRTH: 
EDUCATION:
Peter David Brady 
Marmora, Ontario 
1967
Centre Hastings Secondary School 
Madoc, Ontario, 1981-1986
University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, 
1986-1990 B.A. (Hons.)
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario 
1990-1991 M .A .
181
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
